Abstract
Aiming in the present essay to show how the person may be conceived through its intentional genesis as its highest accomplishment, let us, to start, point out the difficulty inherent in the traditional philosophical perspective in a speculative way. The most coherent theoretical positions, like those of Spinoza, draw their conclusions by relegating the “person” to the psychological level.1 The operative term here is “person.” Spinoza, for instance, expresses his dismay about the impossibility of the speculative thinkers of his time to attribute a meaning to the term “person” at all. Comparably, in the present day philosophy, Giovanni Gentile, talking about the “I,” identifies it with the totality of self-consciousness, attributing Spinoza’s own failure to the “naturalistic” approach.2
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References
Spinoza, Cogitata Metaphysia, II. C. 8: “Non fugit nos vocabulum quod theologi passim usurpant ad rem explicandam; verum, quamvis vocabulum non ignoramus, eius tamen signiflcationem ignoramus, nec ullum clarum et distinctum conceptum illius formare possumus.”
Giovanni Gentile, Sistema di logica come Theoria del Conoscere, vol. 2, Florence, 1959, Opere VI, p. 238: “L’lo come noi l’intendiamo e come si deve intendere, e il Tutto, che si attua nell’attualita del pensiero; questo dramma divino, in cui nulla e pensabile che non vi partecipi con la totalita del suo essere. E’ questa la vera emenda- zione dell’intelletto, a cui mirava Spinoza, che sempre concepi la sua filosofia come un’etica, ma non pote attuarla, invasato com’era dalla sua idea naturalistica del divino; la riforma del pensiero che, sdegnando ogni neghittosa contemplazione astratta, pensi, e pensi se stesso.”
II Formalismo nell’Etica e l’Etica Materiale dei Valori, trad. it. ridotta di G. Alliney, Milan, 1944, p. 173.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Rigobello, A. (1979). The Person as the Accomplishment of Intentional Acts. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology. Analecta Husserliana, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9437-9_13
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