Abstract
My aim in this paper is to discuss some of the things Sellars has said over the years about the logic of practical inference. His views on this subject are becoming progressively more complicated, and I think this development is unfortunate. I shall argue that if Sellars’ early views are simplified in the right way, he could reasonably draw the conclusion, which I now accept, that there is actually no need for a special logic of practical inference.
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Notes
Immanuel Kant,The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary J. Gregor, tr. New York, 1964, p. 20.
See Bruce Aune, ’Sellars on Practical Reason’, inAction, Knowledge, and Reality (ed. by H.N. Castañeda), Indianapolis, 1975, pp. 14–22, and H.N. Castañeda, ’Some Reflections on Wilfrid Sellars’ Theory of Intentions’, inAction, Knowledge, and Reality, pp. 47–50.
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© 1978 Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Aune, B. (1978). Sellars on Practical Inference. In: Pitt, J.C. (eds) The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9848-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9848-3_2
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