Abstract
“Your thoughts are pleasing to God, but your actions are not!” is the message imparted by an angel to the King of the Khazars in a dream. The king’s quest to understand the dream and its message sets the dramatic setting for R. Judah Halevi’s Kuzari. The ruler of the Khazars seeks enlightenment first from a philosopher, next a Christian, and then a Moslem. Unsatisfied with each of their answers, he reluctantly turns to a Jewish sage.1 The inferior social situation of the Jews convinces him that they will not be able to satisfy him in his quest. If might does not make right, at least it reflects it. The sage in Halevi’s rendering of the story succeeds of course in unraveling to the Khazar king the meaning of the dream. The king and his court subsequently convert to Judaism. After the conversion, the king continues to receive instruction from the sage. The dialogue between the king and the sage covers the five sections of the Kuzari. At the end of the treatise, the sage begs his leave of the king in order to make his way to the Land of Israel.
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Literatur
Kitab al-Khazari, David Banethed. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1977). The Kuzari was translated into English by Hartwig Hirsch feld. All English translations from the Kuzari in this chapter are my own based on the Arabic original. I have consulted with Hir schfeld’s translation (New York: Shocken Books, 1974), the medieval Hebrew translation of Yehudah Ibn Tibbon, and the modern Heb rew translations of Yehuda Even Shmuel (Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing, 1972) and Joseph Kafih (Kiryat Ono, Israel: Mach on Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1997). Both Hirschfeld an d Even Shmuel frequently tend to translate quite freely, so the reader should exercise wariness when using their translations. Page numbers by the translated passages refer to Hirsch feld’s translation unless otherwise noted. For a history of the Khazars, see D. M. Dunlop, The History of the Jewish Khazars (New York: Sch ocken Books, 1967). The tale of the king’s dream appears in the correspondence of the Khazarkin g to Hasdai Ibn Shaprut. For a translation of this correspondence, see Curt Leviant ed., Masterpieces of Hebrew Literature (New York: Ktav Publishing, 1969): 164–69. The authenticity of this correspondence is questionable, but its veracity was widely accepted by the Jews of Spain. It provided Halevi with the key “historical” elements upon which he based his fictional dialogue. Halevi. See Zucker, Saadya’s Commentary on Genesis, 197 n.191.
The structure of the Kuzari has been analyzed in detail by Eliezer Schweid in: Feeling and Speculation [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Massadah Press, 1970): 37–79 Schweid argues that a much tighter organization characterizes the book than I have suggested here. In my view it is precisely the looseness of the organization that endows the dialogue with its authentic quality.
See S.D. Goitein, “The Biography of R. Judah Halevi in the Light of the Cairo Geniza Documents”, PAAJR, 28 (1959): 41–56; idem., A Mediterranean Society, vol. 5 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1988): 465.
Kuzari 4.3.
I have analyzed aspects of Halevi’s complex attitude to philosophy in two previous studies: “Judah Hal evi and the Problem of Philosophical Ethics [Heb.]”, in: A. Sagi and D. Statman eds., Between Religion and Ethics (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan, 1993): 171–183; “Judah Hal evi’s Kuzari: Between the God of Abraham and the God of Aristotle”, in: R. Munk, F.J. Hoogewould eds., Joodse filosofie tussen rede en traditie (Kok-Kampen, 1993): 24–34. For an additional significant perspective on this issue see, Y. Tzvi Langerman, “Science and the Kuzari”, Science in Context, 10 (1997): 495–522.
See Alexander Altmann, “The Climatological Factor in Judah Halevi’s Theory of Prophecy [Heb.]”, Melilah, 1 (1944): 15–16. The distinction between philosophic and mystical is a difficult one to delineate in this period in light of the fact that mystic elements mark the prevalent Aristotelian-Neoplatonic philosophic tradition. More recently Elliot Wolfson has shown the importance of earlier Jewish mystical conceptions in Halevi’s thought. See “Merkavah Traditions in Philosophical Garb: Judah Halevi Reconsidered”, PAAJR, 57 (1990–91): 179–242; idem. Through a Speculum that Shines (Princeton: Princet on Universi ty, 1994): 163–187.
See Jacob Levinger, “The Kuzari and its Significance [Heb.]”, Tarbis, 40 (1971): 472–82.
Yohanan Silman has based his analysis of the Kuzari on the differences between what he identifies as its earlier and later parts. Silman views Halevi as moving away from the position of the philosophers. See Philosopher and Prophet: Judah Halevi, the Kuzari, and the Evolution of His Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). For a different view of the changes in Halevi’s thought, see Shlomo Pines, “Shi’ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 2 (1980): 165–219. Pines argues that Halevi began framing his thought under the influence of Isma’i1i conceptions and at a later stage moved towards the conceptual scheme of the philosophers.
Kuzari 5.22-26.
Much of the relevant bibliography is brought by Elliot Wolfson, “Merkavah Traditions in Philosophical Garb.” The works of Elliot Wolfson and Shlomo Pines have calle d attention to sources for Halevi’s views that certainly have not received sufficient recognition till now — that is, merkavah mysticism and Ismaili theology respectively. See most recently Diana Lobel’s in-depth analysis of critical terms employed by Halevi that owe their origin to Islamic mystical literature in: Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Leui’s Kuzari (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000). She includes in her study Avicerma’s writings th at form ed an important bridge between Aristotelian-Alfarabian philosophy and Islamic mystical thought. The question remains whether these sources served as the dominant influence on Halevi’s approach (aside from Avicenna whom I include among the Aristotelian thinkers). I shall argue th at the views of R. Saadiah and the Aristotelian philosophers played a more important role. Elliot Wolfson has also argued the importance of Halevi’s poetry for understanding his philosophy. He has shown that many of the same motifs appearing in the Kuzari appear in his poetry and help further illuminate his views. Wolfson’s app roach reflects the recent trend that characterizes research on the philosophy of Ibn Gabirol. The philosophic importance of Halevi’s poetry has also been accepted by a number of important twentieth century thinkers, most notably Franz Rosenzweig and Yeshayahu Leibowitz. The obvious merits of this approach notwithstanding, I have a number of reservations concerning its validity. While Halevi’s poetry may be a better source than the Kuzari for appreciating his deepest feelings and yearnings — his “true philosophy” in the broad sense of the term — I question whether it serves as a good source for understanding his conceptual thinking. Critical terms are often used in a less than precise technical sense in the Kuzari, though he deals there with issues in a discursive manner. How much more so is this point true of his poetic creations, which in addition to give vent to his deepest feelings, were subject to the numerous conventions governing Hebrew poetry of the period, and were often designed to serve a liturgical function.
See the section, “The Verification of Prophecy” in chapter l.
Kuzari 1.31–43.
Pines discusses the parallels between Halevi’s approach to the chain of existence and the place occupied by the prophets and the approach found in Isma’ili theology. See “Shi’ite Terms and Conceptions”, 178-192. While Pin es notes the differences between the approaches of the theologians and the philosophers it is important to keep in mind their essential simila ritl on this issue. For a discussion of the philosophers’ approach, see be low.
This is the conclusion drawn by Harry Wolfson in “Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy”, JQR, 32 (1941–42): 345–70 and JQR, 33 (1942–43): 49–82 [reprin his Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, Vol. 2, Isadore Twersky and George Williams eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1977): 60–119].
For the penetration of Greek philosophy into the Islamic world see Abd al-Rahrnan Badawi, La Transmission de la Philosophie Grecque au Monde Arabe (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987); see also F.E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs (New York: New York University, 1968).
For a discussion of Israeli’s philosophy and a translation into English of his few surviving philosophic works, see A. Altmann and S. M. Stern, Isaac Israeli (Oxford: Oxford University, 1958). Altmann discusses the vari ous dimensions of Israeli’s approach to prophecy on pages 185–217.
Book of Elements in: Isaac Israeli, p. 135.
See Georges Vajda, “Le commentaire kairouanais sur le Livre de la Creation”, REF, 107 (1948): 154–56; see also Isaac Israeli, 189–190.
Kuzari 1.1:37–8 (Baneth, 5–6).
Many of these notions are repeated in the name of the philosophers in Kazan 4.19.
It is uncertain whether Halevi was acquainted with the views of Alfarabi first hand or only indirectly. In either case, Halevi’s „philosopher“ reflects primarily the approach presented by Alfarabi in some of his earlier writings such as The Political Regime, and the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City. In his later work, Letter on the Intellect, Alfarabi presents a more detailed exposition on the perfection of the intellect. For a discussion of Alfarabi’s and Avicenna’s views on the Active Intellect and human perfection, see in particular Herbert Davidson, „Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect“, Viator, 3 (1972): 109–78. Davidson discusses Halevi’s indebtedness to these views in his, „The Active Intellect in the Cuzari and Halevi’s Theory of Causality“, REJ, 131 (1972): 351–74. In addition to introducing certain „mystic“ notions in his description of ultimate perfection absent from Alfarabi’s discourse on the subject, Avicenna differs from Alfarabi by holding the view that certain exceptional individuals may become prepared for the ultimate level prior to the completion of their scientific studies. A good summary and comparison of Alfarabi’s and Avicenna’s approaches to these issues can also be found in Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958): 12–20. For Ibn Bajja’s views, see Alexander Altmann, „Ibn Bajja on Man’s Ultimate Felicity“, in A. Hyman and S. Lieberman eds., Harry Wolf son Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1965): 47–87 [repr. in A. Altmann, Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969): 73–107]. Alfarabi vacillates on the question of the origin of the human „form.“ The view presented by Halevi’s „philosopher“ that it is engendered by the parents reflects Alfarabi’s position in his Philosophy of Aristotle. The view that the immortal intellect attaining perfection losses its individuality may either be traced to Ibn Bajja or to a popularized version of Alfarabi’s view, as Davidson has argued („The Active Intellect in the Cuzari“, 359f.). The description of Halevi’s „philosopher“ of the union of the immortal intellects is reminiscent of, though not identical with, Alfarabi’s description in the Political Regime. This passage was translated by Fauzi Najjar and appears in: R. Lerner and M. Mahdi eds., Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1972): 38. Alfarabi’s identification of the Active Intellect with the Holy Spirit, and the angels with the Separate Intellects, occurs in the Virtuous City and The Political Regime. The Separate Intellects are also identified with the „spiritual beings“, a point that is of significance in exploring Halevi’s use of the term. See Richard Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985): 52–3, 363–4.
For a discussion of Alfarabi’s theory of prophecy, see Richard Walzer, „Al-Farabi’s Theory of Prophecy and Divination“, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 77 (1957): 142–8 [repr. in his Greek into Arabic (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969): 206–19]; Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, 36f.; Davidson, „Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect“, 144f.; Jeffrey Macy, „Prophecy in al-Farabi and Maimonides: The Imaginative and Rational Faculties„, in: S. Pines and Y. Yovel eds., Maimonides and Philosophy, (Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1986): 185–92. The notion of a revelation being attained by both faculties of the perfect individual (wahy by the rational faculty and nubu’a by the imaginative) is mentioned by Alfarabi in the Virtuous City. See Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State, 244-5.
The treatise was published by S. Landauer, „Die Pyschologie des Ibn Sina“, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, 29 (1876): 335–418.
Kuzari 5.12:266 (Baneth, 206). For the passage in Avicenna on which Halevi’s description is based, see Landauer, „Die Psychologie“, 364–5.
Najāt, Book II, chap. 6; translated by Fauzi Rahman, Avicenna’s Psychology (London: Oxford University Press, 1952): 36–7. A parallel passage is found in F. Rahman ed., Avicenna’s De Anima (London: Oxford University Press, 1959): 249–50. Alghazali summarizes Avicenna’s view in his Incoherence of Philosophy. See Averroes, The Incoherence of the Incoherence, S. Van Den Bergh trans. (Oxford: Oxford University, 1954): Vol. 1, 313–14. For a discussion of Avicenna’s approach to prophecy see Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, 31f.; Davidson, „Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect“, 176f. In Theorems and Axioms, Avicenna presents a more mystical view of perfection that differs in tone, if not also in content, with the description of prophecy in his psychological works. There he describes the ecstasy experienced by the perfect individual in attaining intellectual illumination of the divine world and, on the ultimate level, an identity with the Truth. See Kitāb al-Ishārāt w-al-Tanbīhāt, J. Forget ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1892): 202–4. Ibn Tufayl brings a summary of this passage in his Hayy ben Yaqdhan, Leon Gauthier ed. (Beirut: 1936): 7. See also my, „Sage and Prophet in the Thought of Maimonides and his Followers [Heb.]“, Eshel Bersheva, 3 (1986): 149–169.
Kuzari 1.25.
Ibid. 1.48–52.
Book of Beliefs and Opinions introduction.6. For a discussion of this point see the previous chapter, „The Verification of Prophecy.“
Kuzari 1.87:61 (Baneth, 24-5). Compare this passage with the speech of Halevi’s „philosopher“ at the beginning of the Kuzari. In the case of Mosaic prophecy, Halevi rejects both aspects of the philosophers’ approach to prophecy that he presents there — the intellectual and the imaginative.
See Exodus 19:10–11.
Kuzari 1.89:62–3 (Baneth, 26). For R. Saadiah’s view see the section, „The Nature of the Prophetic Phenomenon“ in chapter 1.
Ibid. 2.4:87 (Baneth, 45-6).
See „The Nature of the Prophetic Phenomenon“ in the previous chapter. H. Wolfson discusses Halevi’s view and traces its Neoplatonic sources. See „Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy“, 50-2. It should be noted that Halevi uses the term „spiritual“ in different ways. When used in reference to higher-order beings (rūhāniyyāt), it designates either incorporeal entities, in accordance with the view of the Aristotelian philosophers (Kuzari 1.1; 4.3), or entities composed of a fine, „ethereal“ substance, as R. Saadiah conceives it. The only incorporeal entity in R. Saadiah’s ontology, it should be noted, is God. In the present context, Halevi clearly has R. Saadiah’s view of the Glory in mind. For a further discussion of the „spiritual beings“ in Halevi’s thought, and Islamic theological sources that may have influenced him on this matter, see Shlomo Pines, „On the term Rūhāniyyāt and its Origin and on Judah Halevi’s Doctrine [Heb.]„, Tarbiz, 57 (1988): 511–40.
Die Pyschologie des Ibn Sina“, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, 29 (1876): 335–418 See above, note 25.
Kuzari 4.25:235 (Baneth, 181).
Ibid. 4.3.
For a discussion of Halevi’s commentary on the Book of Creation, see Raphael Jospe, „Early Philosophical Commentaries on the Sefer Yezirah: Some Comments“, REJ, 149 (1990): 394–402. While I agree with Jospe that Halevi’s commentary is heavily influenced by Aristotelian conceptions, I find it hard to accept his equation of Halevi’s identification between „thought“, „speech“ and „writing“ with the Aristotelian identification between „thinker“, „thought“ and „object of thought.“ Halevi is not dealing with the ontological status of thought per se, but with the creative dimension of God’s thought. This Aristotelian notion at best served as a type of model for Halevi’s approach to the issue at hand. It should also be noted that Halevi’s formula of three things being distinct in us but identical in God is similar to Islamic and Jewish discussions of the divine attributes. See, for example, R. Saadiah’s treatment of „life“, „power“ and „know-ledge“ in Book of Beliefs and Opinions 2.1.
Kuzari 4.3; 5. 22–23.
Ibid. 3.11:73. See chapter 1, „Prophecy in R. Saadiah’s Other Writings.“
Ibid. 4.15. This phenomenon is also said to occur during the anointing of a nazarite, the anointing of the king, and when the High Priest consults the urim and tummim in order to divine the future. In 1.103 Halevi mentions the spirituality that arises in those who are in the proximity of the prophet and hear the divine words he speaks. This view too suggests a type of emanating „spiritual“ force.
Ibid. 5.20:284 (Baneth, 221).
See the section, „Prophecy in R. Saadiah’s Other Writings“ in the previous chapter
Joseph Kafih ed. and trans. [Arabic and Hebrew], Sefer Yezirah’ im Perush ha-Gaon Rabbenu Sa’adya ben R. Yosef Fayyumi (Jerusalem, 1972): 109.
See the following section for a discussion of this point. For a discussion of the term ta’yīd in the Kuzari, see Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 127–9. Lobel shows how this term together with the term ilhām (inspiration) were used by Halevi also in reference to the Sages in the period of the Second Temple (Kuzari 3.39). Divine inspiration served as the basis for their legal ordinances; see pp. 132-5.
Kuzari 1.41; 2.8,26; 4.15.
Ibid. 1.109.
Commentary on the Book of Creation, 108–109.
A number of significant parallels between Halevi’s view and those of R. Saadiah in his Bible commentaries are brought by Even Shmuel in his Hebrew translation of the Kuzari, p. 370. R. Saadiah’s commentaries are frequently cited by Halevi’s contemporary and friend, Abraham Ibn Ezra, and appear to have been wellknown in Spain during this period.
Joseph Kaifih ed. and trans. [Arabic and Hebrew], R. Saadiah’s Translation and Commentary on Daniel (Jerusalem: Dror Press, 1981): 120.
Kuzari 2.4.
See the previous chapter, „Prophecy in R. Saadiah’s Other Writings.“
Kuzari 5.25.
Beliefs and Opinions 8.6.
We shall return to a discussion of these two views in the context of Halevi’s discussion of the divine Names in Kuzari 4:3.
See above, note 10.
Kuzari 2.14,24,26; 5.10,20 (Third Principle).
Ibid. 1.26.
According to B. T. Shevu’ot 39a not only the future generations were said to have been present at Sinai, but also the future converts. It is true that the Talmud contains a number of derogatory statements concerning converts. See B. T. Kiddushin 70b; B. T. Niddah 13b; B. T. Yevamot 109b. There is no indication, however, that the Jews possess some type of genetic superiority.
Kuzari 1.27:47 (Baneth, 12).
Ibid. 1.28:47.
To this Halevi adds also the time element — namely, that certain periods are more conducive for experiencing the divine light that is tantamount to the attainment of perfection and the benefits that come in its wake; see Kuzari 4.7. This condition too is in harmony with the astro-logical notion of the influence of the stars and the spheres on the state of the individual mentioned by Halevi in the speech of the philosopher at the beginning of the Kuzari.
Ibid. 1.31–35.
Ibid. 1.42–43:48 (Baneth, 13).
Pines stresses Halevi’s affinity to Isma’ili sources on this issue. It is significant, however, that he produces no Isma’ili source that focuses on supernatural physical attainments as part of this degree. The closest source to this idea that Pines found is the Spanish philosopher Ibn Bajja’s description of a view he ascribes to the Christians; see „Shi’ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari“, 180. In combining biblical and midrashic accounts of the special physical qualities of the prophets, particularly Moses, and the notion of the hierarchy of existence, Halevi need not have relied on a specific source. While certain philosophic views approach those of Halevi, most notably Avicenna’s view of the prophet as miracle worker by virtue of a special quality in his soul, fundamental differences exist between them. Furthermore, he was probably unaware of this particular view since he does not allude to it in his presentations of Aristotelian philosophy. For a discussion of Avicenna’s view and its influence on subsequent Jewish thought beginning with Ibn Ezra, see Aviezer Ravitzky, „The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy“, in:ed]Isadore Twersky ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1984): 238–244 [repr. in his History and Faith: Studies in Jewish Philosophy (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1996): 155–161]. See also my, „Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy“, JQR, 75 (1984): 117f.
Halevi’s approach to the subject of the importance of the Land of Israel for prophecy reflects a combination of midrashic views with the doctrine of climatology. For a discussion of this doctrine in Halevi’s thought, and its sources, see Altmann, „The Climatological Factor in Judah Halevi’s Theory of Prophecy“, 1–17. The subsequent history of this doctrine in Jewish thought has been traced by Abraham Melamed, “The Land of Israel and Climatology in Jewish Thought [Heb.]”, in: M. Hallamish and A. Ravitzky eds., The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zevi, 1991): 52-78. See also my article in the same volume, „The Land of Israel and Prophecy in Medieval Jewish Philosophy [Heb.]“, 40-51. Altmann has argued that some of the midrashic views may also be based on this doctrine. The connection between prophecy and the Land of Israel appears already in the Mekhilta and is found in R. Saadiah’s Book of Beliefs and Opinions.
Kuzari 2.14:92 (Baneth, 50); cf. 2.44; 4.15. Halevi further draws from the philosophic model by maintaining that the telos of the sublunar existents is the most superior level of sublunar existence — namely, that belonging to the prophets and pious.
Ibid. 2.26:102–3 (Baneth, 59–60).
Ibid. 2.24.
For a discussion of this term see Pines, „Shi’ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari„, 167–72.
These points already emerge from the speech of Halevi’s „philosopher“ in Kuzari 1.1.
For a discussion of this point see my, „Judah Halevi and the Problem of Philosophical Ethics“, 171–183. Halevi’s tripartite division of the soul is essentially Platonic in nature.
Kuzari 1.27 47, 95,103; 2.14,44; 4.3,15.
Ibid. 2. 12-24,56; 4.17; 5.23.
Ibid. 2; 2.16, 26,48–50; 3.5–7,39,53.
Ibid.:207–8 (Baneth, 149); cf. 4.15.
A number of notions in this passage are borrowed directly from R. Saadiah’s Commentary on the Book of Creation. Halevi’s reference to the philosophers’ comparison of the world to a great man, and his view that God is the spirit, soul intellect and life of the world are evidently taken from this source. See Commentary, 106–108; see my „Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides: A Preliminary Appraisal“, Maimonidean Studies, 2 (1991): 112–13.
Kazari 4.3:207–8 (Baneth, 155).
The term may have been borrowed specifically from Alghazali as argued by David Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie von Saadia bis Maimuni (Gotha, 1877): 177, 202. For a discussion of the „inner eye“ in the thought of Alghazali see Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazzali (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975): 285, 295–306. An English translation of selections of Alghazali’s Deliverance From Error in which the notion of the „inner eye“ is discussed appears in: W. Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953): 64f. For a recent discussion of this term and other central terms appearing in this passage see Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 103–115. It should be noted that Avicenna at times also speaks of an „inner eye“, equating it with the highest form of intellect. In his treatise On Prayer he writes as follows: „Rather its [the rational soul’s] function is to wait for the revelation of truths, and to reflect with perfect intuition and unclouded wit upon the perception of subtle ideas, reading with the eye of inner vision the tablet of Divine Mystery and opposing with strenuous devises the causes of vain fancy.“ See A.J. Arberry, Avicenna on Theology (London: John Murray, 1951): 53.
For Alfarabi’s approach to prophecy see the following chapter. The hypothesis that Halevi appears to be thinking in terms of the philosophers’ view is in part supported by the continuation of his discussion in Kuzari 4.3: „If the Greek philosophers had witnessed the prophets when they prophesied and performed miracles, they would have conceded to them [the truth of the phenomenon] and sought logical explanations for how humans can attain this level. Some of the philosophers already had done so, particularly those from the [monotheistic] religions.“ Halevi may well have in mind Avicenna’s approach, one that was heavily indebted to Alfarabi and in turn exerted a critical influence on Alghazali, his critique of it notwithstanding.
Kuzari 4.3:211 (Baneth, 158).
See above, note 36.
Kuzari 4.3:211.
See Elliot Wolfson, „Merkavah Traditions in Philosophic Garb“, 194–99. For Halevi’s indebtedness to the Karaites for this view see Daniel J. Lasker, „Judah Halevi and Karaism“, in: J. Neusner, E. Frerichs, N. Sarna eds., From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989): Vol. 3, 115.
Baneth, 158; cf. Book of Beliefs and Opinions 2.12 (Kafih, 111).
Kuzari 2.60.
Ibid. 3.73; cf. 3.11,19.
For a different interpretation of Halevi’s approach in Kuzari 4.3 see Warren Zev Harvey, „Judah Halevi’s Synesthetic Theory of Prophecy and a note on the Zohar [Heb.]“, Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought, 12 [Rivkah Shatz-Uffenheimer Memorial Volume 1] (1996): 141–155. Harvey does not view Halevi as vacillating between two conceptions. He interprets him as developing a conception fundamentally different from both of them by assigning a far different status to the nature of prophetic imagination and its perception of the divine world than do the philosophers.
Kuzari 4.4–6.
Ibid. 4.13–19.
Ibid. 1.103:74 (Baneth, 35); cf. 3.20,53.
Ibid. 1.110.
Kuzari 1.1.
See Ignaz Goldziher, „Le amr ilāhī chez Juda Halevi“, REJ, 50 (1905): 33–41; H. Wofson, „Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy“, 353–70; Israel Efros, „Some Aspects of Yehudah Halevi’s Mysticism“, PAAJR, 11 (1941): 7–16; Davidson, „The Active Intellect in the Cuzari“, 381–95; Pines, „Shi’ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari“, 172–8.
Kuzari 2.26.
Ibid. 5.10.
This is compatible to the approach found by Halevi’s friend and compatriot, Abraham Ibn Ezra, as I have tried to show in my, “On the term Kol in Abraham Ibn Ezra: A Reappraisal”, REJ, 153 (1994): 29–66.
Kuzari 5.21. This position still leaves open the question how the angels, which Halevi at times treats as incorporeal entities, fit into the order of divine governance. He introduces a distinction at the end of the treatise between active and passive intermediaries. This suggests that his intent here is to rule out the existence of active incorporeal intermediaries between God and the world. The angels, even if they be considered incorporeal entities, he views as passive instruments of God.
Ibid. 4.25; cf. 3.17. In Kuzari 2.14 he refers to it as, God of the prophets and of the pious; cf. 4.17.
Ibid. 2.24–26; 5.21.
This is essentially Davidson’s conclusion at the end of his, “The Active Intellect in the Cuzari.” Halevi is not consistent on this point insofar as he treats the amr ilāhī as the bestower of all the forms in Kuzari 5.10.
Ibid. 2.6:87 (Baneth, 46). Halevi’s attitude to essential attributes is itself an ambiguous one. Compare his remarks in Kuzari 2.2 with those at the end of 4.3.
See also Ibid. 4.3.
Fountain of Life 5.37. The work has been preserved in full only on the basis of the medieval Latin translation, edited by C. Baeumker (Munster, 1892). For a study of Ibn Gabirol’s thought see Jacques Schlanger, La philosophie de Salomon ibn Gabirol (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1968). For the sources of Ibn Gabirol’s doctrine of the will, see Alexander Altmann, “Problems of Research in Jewish Neoplatonism [Heb.]”. Tarbi 27 (1958): 501–7.
Ibid. 1.109; 2.8,14,48,62; 3.1,11,15,22–23,41,65; 5.20–25.
See the previous chapter, “Prophecy in R. Saadiah’s Other Writings.” R. Saadiah, it should be noted, identifies the “Spirit of the Living God” with the divine will in his Commentary on the Book of Creation.
Kuzari 1.107; 3.5,17,53.
Ibid. 2.60.
Ibid. 1.95; 4.15.
Ibid. 3.1,20.
Ibid. 3.5.
Ibid. 4.15.
Ibid.. Halevi also reverses the relation and speaks at times of the amr ilāhī conjoining with the perfect (1.95; 2.44).
For a study of Halevi’s attitude to converts see Daniel J. Lasker, “Proselyte Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the Thought of Judah Halevi”, JQR, 81 (1990): 75–92; See also Robert Eisen, “The Problem of the King’s Dream and Non-Jewish Prophecy in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari”, The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, 3 (1994): 231–47.
Kuzari 1.27:47 (Baneth, 12).
Ibid. 3.20.
Ibid. 3.11,20,39,73.
Ibid. 3.53; cf. 1.103; 3.20.
Ibid. 3.3 9; 5.1 0,20. In Kuzari 2.26 Halevi describes the amr ilāhī as bestowing light, wisdom and ilhām, Subsequently in the passage, the light of wisdom and ilhām is juxtaposed with the light of prophecy brought about by the urim and tummim
The distinction between the ilhām of the pious one (walīy) and the wahy (revelation) of the prophet occurs, for example, in the writings of Alghazali. Alghazali too at times blurs the distinction between these phenomena. For a definition of these terms in Alghazali’s writings, see Farid Jabre, Essai sur le Lexique de Ghazali (Beirut: Publications de I’Université Libanaise, 1970): 253, 273, 276–7. Avicenna, it should be noted, at tim es uses ilhām in reference to the prophetic attainment, a view that can be seen in Halevi’s summary of Avicenna’s position. See above, notes 26, 27. Whil e Halevi uses the term ilhām to characterize the attainment of the pious, he seldom employs the term wahy to describe the prophetic attainment (except when h e summarizes the views of the philosophers). It does oc cur, however, in his descriptions of prophecy in Kuzari 3.41 (Baneth, 125); 5. 20, Fourth Principle (Baneth, 223). See Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 120–141.
See Kuzari 3.39,65,73. Halevi ascribes a level very close to prophecy, together with prophetic-like experiences, to a number of rabbinic sages, most notably, R. Aqiva and R. Ishmael.
Ibid. 2.14.
133 See Eisen, “The Problem of the King’s Dream and Non-Jewish Prophecy”, 234.
Kuzari 1.95; 2.2,14–16; 4.17.
Bahya Ibn Paquda, for example, offers a solution that might have as easily been offered by Halevi. He points to the degenerate state of Israel at the time of leaving Egypt, which prompted the need for additional commandments. The forefathers were on a higher level of purity and did not require these commandments. See Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart 9.7 [Menahem Mansoor trans. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973): 422–3]. Halevi makes a similar distinction between the two groups, but in the context of discussing the need for miracles, not commandments; see Kuzari 2.2.
137 See Eisen, “The King’s Dream and Non-Jewish Prophecy”, 237f.
This is the conclusion re ached by Julius Guttmann in his Philosophies of Judaism, David Silverman trans. (New York: Schocken, 1973): 149–50.
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Judah Halevi, R. (2001). The Kuzari. In: Prophecy. Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0820-4_3
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