Abstract
“From Moses [the prophet] to Moses [Maimonides], none arose like Moses [Maimonides]”. This well known epigram reflects the exceptional stature Maimonides (1138?–1204) attained in Jewish history. He was born to an important rabbinic family in Cordova, Spain. Having to flee his native land at an early age as a result of the Almohad persecution, he eventually settled in Fustat, Egypt after a lengthy period of wandering. There he became a court physician and the head of Egyptian Jewry. While his careers as physician and political/religious leader were exceptional in their own right, their significance was greatly overshadowed by the literary works he penned. These works revolutionized Jewish thought and law. Medieval Jewish philosophy reached its zenith in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed. 1 Due to the profundity of the work, together with the unique status of the author, it exerted an enormous impact on subsequent thinkers through the ages, including its opponents. Maimonides was also one of the greatest Jewish legal authorities of all time. His great legal compendium, the Mishneh Torah, written prior to the Guide, was a groundbreaking work. It was the first complete code of Jewish law. Despite attacks on it from various quarters, it quickly achieved widespread acceptance. Its utility, coupled with the vast erudition displayed by its author, made it a nigh indispensable work.2
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Literatur
All English citations in this chapter are from Shlomo Pines’ translation of The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963). Page numbers refer to this edition unless otherwise indicated. The Arabic edition of the Guide utilized is that of Joseph Kafih, Moreh HaNevukhim (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1972).
For the most thorough scholarly study of Maimonides’ code see Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven: Yale University, 1980). Maimonides’ discussion of prophecy in the Mishneh Torah is found in the first section of the first book, The Book of Knowledge. All translations from the Book of Knowledge are my own based on the critical edition of J. Cohen, M.H. Katzenelenbogen, S. Lieberman (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1964).
For a more detailed discussion of this issue see my, Maimonides’ Political Thought: Studies in Ethics, Law and the Human Ideal (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999): 1–61,189–223.
Alfarabi’s political philosophy has been the subject of numerous studies. See in particular Miriam Galston, Politics and Excellence (Princeton: Princeton University, 1990).
See L.V. Berman, “Maimonides, the Dis ciple of Alfarabi”, Israel Oriental Studies, 4 (1974): 154–178. The importance of Alfarabi’s philosophy for the understanding Maimonides’ political thought has been strenuously argued by Leo Strauss, beginning with his Philosophie und Gesetz (Berlin, 1935) [F. Baumann, trans.,Philosophy and Law (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987)]. See also Joel Kraemer, “Mairnonides on the Philosophic Sciences in his Treatise on the Art of Logic”, in Perspectives on Maimonides, Joel Kraemer ed. (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991): 77–104; and my Maimonides’ Political Thought [index: Alfarabi].
For a study of Maimonides’ dogma see Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought (Oxford: Oxford University, 1986): 10–65.
Ideal in much great er detail with all these points in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 210–216, 225–237
Ibid. 189–223
Isaac Shailat ed. and trans., Letters and Essays of Moses Maimonides [Arabic and Heb.] (Maaleh Adumim, Israel: Maaliyot Press, 1988): 553. For a study of the influence of these philosophers on Mairnonides’ thought see Pines’s introduction to his translation of the Guide, “The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed”, lvii-cxxxiv.
10 See my “Moses Maimonides” in: Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman eds., History of Jewish Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 1997): 245–280.
11 Maimonides addresses this issue in Guide 2. 13–25.
See Guide 1. introduction:15–20.
See my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 183–4.
No scholar has done more to make the modern reader of the Guide sensitive to this point than Leo Strauss. See, in particular, his introduction to Pines’ translation of the Guide, “How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed”, xi–Ivi, This point was appreciated by a number of Maimonides’ medieval commentators. For a study of this issue see Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed: Between the Thirteenth and the Twentieth Centuries”, in: Studies in Maimonides, Isadore Twersky ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1990): 159–207 [repr. in his History and Faith: Studies in Jewish Philosophy (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1996): 24 6303].
Guide 1.33.
For a comprehensive bibliography dealing with Maimonides’ approach to prophecy see Jacob I. Dienstag, “Mairnonides and Prophecy Bibliography”, Daat, 37 (1996): 193–228.
The edition of Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah utilized in this chapter is Joseph Kafihed. and trans., Mishnah’im Perush HaRambam [Arabic and Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1963–1965). The two volumes which contain most of the material on prophecy are Seder Zera’im and Seder Neziqin. Maimonides’ reference to the Book on Prophecy that he began to write occurs in Seder Neziqin, 213. He mentions this work in Guide 1.introduction:9. See Hannah Kasher, “Is There an Early Stratum in the Guide of the Perplexed?” Maimonidean Studies, 3 (1992): 105–129.
Strauss pays much attention to this topic in his “How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed.” See also Simon Rawidowicz, “The Question of the Structure of the Guide of the Perplexed [Heb.]”, Tarbiz, 1 (1935): 41–89.
See David Hartman’s perceptive analysis in his (and Abraham Halkin), Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985): 246f. The English translation of the treatise can be found on pages 211–233. I deal with this essay in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 221–223
Contrast Maimonides’ approach with that presented before him by R. Sherira Gaon in: N.D. Rabinovits, Iggeres of Rav Sherira Gaon [Heb.] (Jerusalem, 1991).
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Zera’im, 4.
See below. For a dis cussion of this issue see my “The Verification of Prophecy in Medieval Jewish Philosophy [Heb.]”, Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought, 4 (1984–85): 1–18.
See chapter 1, “The Verification of Prophecy.”
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam : Seder Zera’im, 6.
Ibid. 6.
See, for example Sifre Deuteronomy, 82. Maimonides repeats his view of the meaning of the principle not to add nor subtract in Laws of Mamrim 9.2. There are talmudic passages that suggest the Torah will not undergo any change. See, for example, B.T. Temurah 16a. While Nahmanides agrees with Maimonides’ position, in his commentary to Deuteronomy 4:2 he indicates that it does not follow from a literal reading of the sages’ statements in reference to adding or subtracting to the commandments. See also the Rabad’s Hassagot on Laws of Mamrim 9.2.
B.T. Yoma 80a; B.T. Megilah 2b; B.T. Temurah 16a; J.T. Megilah 1:5; Sifra: Be-Huqotai 13:7. In the rabbinic sources, th is dictum is based on the verse These are the commandments that God commanded Moses for the Israelites at Mount Sinai (Lev. 27:34). Maimonides does not cite this verse but verses from Deuteronomy instead. One of the verses cited by him — It is not in heaven (Deut. 30:12) — appears in the same discussion in B.T. Temurah cited above. In B. T. Baba Mezi’a 59a the verse serves as the “proof text” for the view that we do not listen to a “heavenly voice” in de termining matters of law. According to Deuteronomy Rabbah 8:6 this verse indicates that there will never be another divine Law from Heaven. Heaven, as it wer e, exhausted its stock of laws, leaving all subsequent legislation in the hands of the appropriate human authorities.
B.T. Shabbat 92a. Our editions of the talmud read “holy spirit” (rual; haodesh) and not “prophecy.”
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Neziqin, 393–4; see below.
33 See Genesis 28:15; 32:8; B.T. Berakhot 4a.
Sifre Deuteronomy, 175; B.T. Sanhedrin 90a.
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Zera’im, 14.
36 For a discussion of this issue see Ephraim Urbach, “Halakhah and Prophecy [Heb.]”, Tarbiz, 18 (1947): 1–27.
For a study of how Karaite conceptions helped shape Maimonides’ thought in diverse ways see Daniel J. Lasker, “The Influence of Karaism on Maimonides [Heb.]”, Sefunot, 5 (1996): 145–61.
I advance this argument in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 23–29. We shall see how this approach is reflected also in his later writings.
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Neziqin, 211f. For a discussion of these principles and much of the relevant bibliography see Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought, 10–65. David Blumenthal’s English translation of the principles appears on pages 11–17, and is reprinted from Blumenthal, The Commentary of R. Hoter ben Shelomoh to the Thirt een Principles of Maimonides (Leiden: Brill, 1974).
For Maimonides’ approach to felicity see Gabriella Berzin, “The Conce pt of Happiness in the Teachings of Maimonides and Chasdai Crescas [Heb.] “, Masters Thesis, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1998.
Kellner discusses the various interpretations advanced for Maimonides’ reason for formulating these principles. He also notes pre-Maimonidean efforts within Judaism to formulate a list of dogmas, while rightfully pointing out the fundamental differences between these efforts and that of Maimonides (Dogma in Medieual jewish Thought, 1–10). For all the novelty in Maimonides’ approach, I prefer to view it more as part of a continuum. The efforts of R. Saadiah Gaon, R. Bahya Ibn Paquda and R. Judah Halevi, among others, were not lost on Maimonides for all the differences in their approaches.
Maimonides is quite explicit on the point that one who does not attain the perfection of the intellect experiences no form of afterlife. For a further discussion of this issue and the relevant bibliography see my “Imitatio Dei in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed”, AJSReview, 19 (1994): 169–211 [repr. with revisions in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 125–158].
See my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 189–223.
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Neziqin, 212. The translation is my own.
Ibid. 212.
Translated by Fauzzi Najjar in: R. Lerner and M. Mahdieds., Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1972): 36–7.
47 For a discussion of the acquired intellect in the philosophy of Alfarabi see Herbert Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect”, Viator, 3 (1972): 118–22, 130, 141–4, 151–3, 160. See also Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958): 12–20. Alexander Altmann traces Maimonides’ use of this notion and its sources in “Maimon ides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics”, in his Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aujklaerung (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987): 77–84. See also Herbert Davidson, “Maimon ide s on Metaphysical Knowledge”, Maimonidean Studies, 3 (1992–93): 49–103.
The nature of the prophecy of Moses has been the subject of a number of scholarly studies. See in particular Jacob Levinger, “The Prophecy of Moses according to Maimonides [Heb.]“, Proceedings of the Fourth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1968): 335–9; Alvin Reines, “Mairnonides’ Concept of Mosaic Prophecy”, HUCA, 40 (1969): 325–62; Norbert Samuelson, “Comments on “Maimonides’ Concept of Mosaic Prophecy”, CCARJ, 18 (1971): 9–25; Menachem Kellner, “Maimonides and Ccrsonides on Mosaic Prophecy”, Speculum, 52 (1977): 62f.; Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas: Natural or Divine Prophecy?” AJSreview, 3 (1978): 14–17; Kalman Bland, “Moses and the Law According to Mairnonides”, in: J. Reinharz and D. Swetschinski eds., Mystics, Philosophers and Politicians (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982): 49–66.
Mishnah’ im Perush. HaRamb am: SederNeziqin, 212–13.
See above, note 18.
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Neziqin, 213–14.
Beha’ alotekha 12:8. See H.S. Horovitz ed., Siphre d’be Rab (Leipzig, 1917): 276. This midrash from Sifre Zutta was preserved in Midrash Ha-Gadol. The midrash, presents Numbers 12:8 as its proof text. For a discussion of Sifre Zutta see Saul Lieberman, Siphre Zutta [Heb.] (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1968). For R. Saadiahs view see, “The Nature of the Prophetic Phenomenon”, in chapter 1.
Maimonides’ use of the image of the rending of a veil (hijāab) is reminiscent of Sufi descriptions of prophetic illumination. The image of the “veil” recurs in Eight Chapters, chapter 7 and in Guide 3.9. Maimonides chose not to employ in this context the rabbinic “pa rallel” motif that Moses saw God through a “shining speculum” aspaqlariya me’ira while the other prophets saw God through one that is not shining (B. T. Yevamot 49b). Maimonides is well aware of this rabbinic motif and equates it with the motif of the veils in Commentary on the Mishnah: Kelim 30:2. Two reasons may account for why Maimonides preferred the Islamic motif here. The first is that the image of tearing veils in order to glimpse God is a more suitable one for describing the process of attaining prophetic illumination. This image suggests that Moses engaged in extensive preparations in preparing himself for prophecy, a point that emerges clearly and consistently from Maimonides’ descriptions of Mosaic prophecy (leaving aside the issue of the “supernatural” aspect of this prophecy). The other reason is that he formulates his description here in a manner designed to suggest that no intermediary remained between Moses and God in Moses’ prophetic state. Rending all veils conveys this idea, while seeing God by means of a “shining speculum” does not. In the other contexts Maimonides treats “matter” as the remaining veil that prevents the intellect, including Moses’ intellect, from apprehending God.
The Arabic edition (together with Hebrew translation of this work) was prepared by Joseph Kafih (Jerusalem, 1973). The work was translated into English by Menahem Mansoor, The Book of Direction to the Duties of the Heart (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973). R. Bahya was deeply influenced by Islamic thought, including that of the sufis, as is evident from his treatise. See Mansoors discussion of this issue in the introduction to his translation, pp. 22–35. For some of the influences of R. Bahya’s thought on that of Maimonides see my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 233-5. R. Bahya writes in 8.4 of his treatise: “When you keep them in mind [the thirty aspects of self reckoning] and think of them frequently, your soul is purified and your mind illumined and in your heart you shall see the form of every secret meaning and with your eyes you shall observe the real truths. The gate to all the virtues will be opened for you and the veil (hijāab)) which stands between you and the Creator’s wisdom will be removed from your eyes (p. 399).”
The term le-ha’amiti (to believe) that appears in most editions of the principles in Hebrew is an addition of the medieval Hebrew translator, R. Shlomo ben Ya’acov, the Physician.
For a discussion of the term i’tiqāad in Maimonides see S. Rawidowicz, “On Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Madda”, in: I. Epstein, E. Levine and C. Roth eds., Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J. H. Hertz (London, 1942): 331–339 [repr. in S. Rawidowicz, Studies in Jewish Thought, N. Glatzer ed. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1974): 317-323]; A. Nuriel, “Maimonides and the Concept of Faith [Heb.]”, Daat, 2-3 (1979),43-47.
57 See Aphorisms of the Statesman, D. M. Dunlop ed. and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1961): 54; The Political Regime, translated by F. Najjar in: Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy, 37. For a further discussion of this point see my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 79–83.
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Neziqin, 214.
B.T. Avodah Zarah 20b.
62 Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Neziqin, 390.
I will deal with this virtue in the discussion of Guide 2.38.
Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Neziqin, 395.
For a discussion of Maimonides’ indebtedness to Avicenna’s view see Alexander Altmann, “Essence and Existence in Mairnonides”, in his Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1969): 108–127.
68 See for example, Isaac Shailat’s attempt to reconcile the two discussions in his Haqdamot HaRambam La-Mishnah (Jerusalem: Maaliyot Press, 1992): 310–11.
See for example, Isaac Shailat’s attempt to reconcile the two discussions in his Haqdamot HaRambam La-Mishnah (Jerusalem: Maaliyot Press, 1992): 310–11.
For an analysis of the topics Maimonides includes in this section in light of Alfarabi’s thought see Joel Kraemer, “Alfarabi’s Opinions of the Virtuous City and Maimonides’ Foundations of the Law”, in: Studia Orientalia Memoriae D. H. Baneth Dedicata (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979): 107–153.
The Book of the Commandments was written in 1169, a year after the Commentary was completed. The Mishneh Torah was completed in 1184. See Joseph Kafih, Iggerot HaRambam (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1987): 12.
See my Maimon ides’ Political Thought, 214–16, 229–30
For an a nalysis of these commandments see Gerald Blidstein, “Maimonidean Structures of Institutional Authority: Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 172-177”, Dine Israel, 17 (1983): 103–26. See also Leo Strauss, “Li terary Character of the Guide”, in his Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glenco, 1952): 91 n.156.
I discuss this point in detail in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 200–204, 225–237.
B. T. Hagigah 14b. See Maimonides’ commentary to Mishnah Hagigah 2:1.
Laws of the Principles of the Torah 2.3–8. On the use of the term “form” (zurah) for the Separate Intellect see my “The Term kol in Abraham Ibn Ezra: A Reappraisa”, REJ, 153 (1994): 59. R. Abraham Bar Hiyya also uses zurah for the Separate Intellect in his Hegyon Ha-Nepesch Ha-Atzuvah, Geoffrey Wigoder ed. (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1971): 41.
See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 137–139.
For a discussion of Maimonides’ dialectical relation with Halevi’ s thought see my, “Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides: A Preliminary Appraisal”, Maimonidean Studies, 2 (1991): 95–121. I have discussed Halevi’s indebtedness to the philosophers’ approach in the previous chapter, “Proph ecy and the Perfection of th e Individual.”
In this manner the Judah and Samuel Ibn Tibbon tran slated ittisal when rendering th e works of Bahya Ibn Paquda, Judah Halevi and Maimonides into Hebrew. The term deve qut in thesense of conjunction appears prior to Maimonides in Abraham Ibn Ezra’s commentary on Numbers 20:8, among other sources. Maimonides, however, employs the term daveq in a far different sense. See Laws of Character Traits 6.2. There may be a hint of the notion of some form of onto logical union in Maimonides’ use of this term in Laws of Repentance 7.6-7. The passage deals with one whose repentance involves the entire person ality of the individual.
See Berz in, “The Co ncept of Happiness in the Teachings of Maimonides and Chas dai Crescas”, 34–78.
See above, note 74.
B. T. Sanhedrin 90a. The law to heed the prophet when he temporarily suspends a commandment of the Torah has its source in the Sifre on Deuteronomy 18:16. The exception of idolatry to this rule, however, is not mentioned th ere. Maimonides cites th e passage from the Sifre in Book of the Commandments, positive commandment 172. In Laws of the Principles of the Torah 9.3 his citation consists of a conflated version of both rabbinic sources.
See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 63–92.
See Lawrence Kaplan, “Mairnonides on the Singularity of the Jewish People”, Daat, 15 (1985): V–XXVI.
For a further study of this issue see most recently Gerald Blidstein, “On the Institutionalization of Prophecy in Maimonidean Halakha [Heb.]”, Daat, 43 (1999): 25–42; see also my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 23-26.
Laws of Repentance 9.1-2; Laws of Kings 11.1–12:5. Maimonides: approach to messianism has been the subject of a number of pen etrating studies. See in particular Amos Funkenstein, “Maimo nides: Political Theory and Realistic Messianism”, Miscellanea Medieavalia, 9 (1977): 81-103; Aviezer Ravitzky, “‘To the Utmost of Human Capacity’: Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah”, in: Kraemer, Perspectives on Maimonides 221-56 [repr. in his History and Faith, 73–114].
Cf. Laws of Kings 12.3 where he is described as attaining th e holy sp ir it. See also the Epistle to the Jews of Yemen discussed immediately below.
Epistle to the Jews of Yemen in: Shailat, Letters and Essays of Moses Maimonides, 82–171. This epistle was translated by Halkin and discussed by Hartman in their Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, 91–207.
Crisis and Leadership, 100. I have emended the translation found there.
Crisis and Leadership, 103.
Ibid. 104.
Sifre Deuteronomy, 343.
Crisis and Leadership, 110–13.
Crisis and Leadership, 124.
Shailat, Letters and Essays of Moses Maimonides, 152–3.
See Mishnah Hagigah 2:1.
See Pines, “The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed”, civ–cv.
See, for example. In troduction to Pereq Heleq principle 3; Laws of the Principles of the Torah 1.7-12.
See chapter 1, “The Nature of the Prophetic Phenomenon;” “Prophecy in R. Saadiah’s Other Writings.”
Eight Chapters 7; Laws of the Principles of the Torah 1.10.
Alfarabi’s lost commentary, cited by a number of philosophers including Maimonides, provided Pines with the foundation for his interpretation that Maimonides too rejected the possibility of human immortality. See his “The Limitations of Human Knowledge according to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides”, in: I. Twersky ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1979): 82–109. Davidson presents a detailed critique of Pines’ position in, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge”, 49–103; see also Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics”, 60–129.
For a discussion of this chapter see Hannah Kasher, “Mairnonides Interpretations of the Story of the Divine Revelation in the Cleft of the Rock [Heb.]”, Daat, 35 (1995): 29–66.
See my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 125–158.
For a study of th e different interpretations Maimonides presents of this prophetic parable see Sara Klein-Braslavy, “Maimonides’ Interpretations of Jacob’s Dream of the Ladder [Heb.]”, Bar-Ilan, 22–23 (1988): 329–49.
A number of scholars have dealt with this issue. See in particular Lawrence Kaplan, “Maimonides on the Miraculous Element in Prophecy”, HTR, 70 (1977): 233–56; Herbert Davidson, “Maimonides’ Secret Position on Creation”, in: Isadore Twersky ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 1979): 16–40; Warren Z. Harvey, “A Third Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle”, HTR, 74 (1981): 287-301.
For a discussion of Maimonides’ approach to miracles see my “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy”, JQR, 75 (1984): 106–114.
Genesis Rabbah 5:5. Maimonides brings this view in his own name in Eight Chapters 8 and again in his commentary on Mishnah Avot 5:5.
The first class corresponds to those ethical propositions accepted by all or most people in accordance with natural law; see Aristotle, Topics 1.10.104a; Rhetoric 1.13.1373b-1374b. The second corresponds to conventional law as laid down in society by the lawgiver; see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.7.1134b-1l35a. Most of the eight remaining Commandments belong to the former category. The Commandment to observe the Sabbath belongs to the latter. The status of the Commandment against idolatry is an ambiguous one in Maimonides’ writings. In this context he appears to regard it as corresponding to laws based on tradition. In some places he appears to hold that it is mandated by the intellect. See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 29–40, 88.
I have expanded upon this point in my article, “The Voice of God in Medieval Jewish Philosophic Exegesis [Heb.]”, Daat, 16 (1986): 29–38.
See my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 82–3.
123 In Guide 2.6:264 the Active Intellect is called the “Prince of the World”, the epithet of the angel Metatron. For a discussion of the philosophic identity of this angel see Elliot Wolfson, “God, the Demiurge and the Intellect: On the Usage of the Word Kol in Abraham Ibn Ezra”, REJ, 149 (1990): 81–84. See also my “The Term kol in Abraham Ibn Ezra: A Reappraisal”, 42f., 57f.
See my “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy”, 114.
For a detailed treatment of the role of the imagination in Maimonides’ philosophy, and the sources for his approach see H.A. Wolfson, “The Internal Senses in Latin. Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts”, HTR, 28 (1935): 69–133 [repr, in H.A. Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, Vol. 1, I. Twersky and G. Williams eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1973): 250–314]; and “Maimonides on the Internal Senses”, JQR, 25 (1934): 441–467 [repr. in Studies, 344–370].
The importance of these two Alfarabian models for understanding Maimonides’ approach to prophecy has been shown by Jeffrey Macy, “Prophecy in al-Farabi and Maimonides: The Imaginative and Rational Faculties”, in: S. Pines and Y. Yovel eds., Maimonides and Philosophy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986): 185–201. As I pointed out the previous chapter, Halevi’s “philosopher” incorporates the distinction between wahy and nubū’a in his presentation. Wahy is used by Alfarabi also in a more general sense to include imaginative prophecy as well as intellectual illumination. While Maimonides draws upon both models of prophecy, he does not appear to distinguish between these two terms. They are used interchangeably in his discussions. Avraham Nuriel has argued that one can in fact detect a distinction between them in Maimonides’ usage. In his view, wahy refers to the revelatory experience while nubū’a refers to the prophetic mission. See “The Terms nubū’a and Vahi in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed [Heb.]”, Tarbiz, 59 (1990): 243–46. Nuriel’s analysis notwithstanding, the distinction cannot be sustained. Maimonides frequently uses the term nubū’a in reference to prophecy in general even when no “mission” is involved. In 2.32, for example, he uses the term in this sense, as is the case in 2.35 and 2.45.
According to a variant reading, the sentence should be translated: “For that reason, the things occur to it after being discovered by deliberation.” See Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect”, 146 n.ll.
Richard Walzer ed. and trans., Al-Farabi on the Perfect State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985): 219–25.
See Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect”, 146.
See Guide 2.4, 12.
In both Alfarabi’s and Maimonides’ thought, a similar role is ascribed to the Active Intellect in the rational faculty’s attainment of intelligibles. Some scholars have argued, however, that Maimonides was more influenced by Avicenna in his epistemological approach. Avicenna maintains that the Active Intellect bestows the particular intelligible directly. I dispute this interpretation in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 312f.
B.T. Berakhot 57b. The most important philosophic source for the connection between dreams and prophecy is Aristotle’s De Divinatione. For the history of the reception of this work in the Islamic world see Shlomo Pines, “The Arabic recension of Paroa Naturalia and the philosophical doctrine concerning veridical dreams according to al-Ris:ala al-Manāmiyya and other sources”, Israel Oriental Studies, 4 (1974): 104-53 [repr, in: Shlomo Pines, Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and in Mediaeval Science (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986): 96–145].
I argue this point in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 63–92.
See above, note 109.
The question remains whether Maimonides continues to use the term in the same manner as before. Both Altmann and Davidson have argued that “conjunction” in this context should not be interpreted along Alfarabian lines, but Avicennian. Every intelligible is attained by “conjunction” with the Active Intellect. My own view is that Maimonides’ usage should be interpreted in accordance with Alfarabi’s approach. See above, note 132.
See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 141–150.
Sefer HaMitzvot, Joseph Kafih ed. and trans. [Arabic and Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1971): 196. See also Laws of Idolatry 11.6.
Guide 2.22, 23.
See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 41–47.
143 Ibid. 10, 132–136.
See, for example, Fazlur Rahman ed, Avicenna’ s De Anima (London: Oxford University Press, 1959): 248–50. For a translation of the parallel discussion in Avicenna’s Najāt, Book II, chap. 6 see F. Rahman, Avicenna’s Psychology (London: Oxford University Press, 1952) 36-7. For a discussion of hads in Avicenna see Dmitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988): 159-176. Maimonides’ mention of hads as a virtue of the rational faculty in Eight Chapters 2 indicates that he was well aware of the philosophic tradition connecting this power with the attainment of theoretical knowledge.
I argue this point in more detail in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 83–87.
See above, note 144.
The “flashes” is an image employed by Avicenna in Theorems and Axioms in his description of the experience of the gnostic in apprehending the divine world. See Kitab al-Ishārāt w-al-Tanbīhāt, J. Forget ed. (Leyden: Bri1l, 1892): 202–4; see also my, “Sage and Prophet in the Thought of Maimonides and his Followers [Heb.]”, Eshel Bersheva, 3 (1986): 15lf.
Guide 1. 68. Despite Avicenna’s influence on Maimonides in 2.38, the view advanced by some scholars that he follows Avicenna in maintaining that the Active Intellect impresses each intelligible directly upon the rational faculty is without foundation in my view. This view in large part depends on a comment of Maimonides in 3.8. See above, Despite Avicenna’s influence on Maimonides in 2.38, the view advanced by some scholars that he follows Avicenna in maintaining that the Active Intellect impresses each intelligible directly upon the rational faculty is without foundation in my view. This view in large part depends on a comment of Maimonides in 3.8. See above Maimonides’ Political Thought, 312f. note 132.
This is Halevi’s view as I have shown in the previous chapter. It is interesting to note that Albert Einstein was once asked: “What internal or mental images, what kind of “internal words” make use of; whether they are motor, auditory, visual or mixed, depending on the subject which they are studying … Do the mental pictures or internal words present themselves in the full consciousness or in the fringe-consciousness?” Einstein replied: “The words or the language … do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be “voluntarily” reproduced and combined … Taken from a psychological viewpoint, this combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in productive thought_before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other kinds of signs which can be communicated to others [italics mine].” See Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Dell Publishing, 1954): 35.
The notion that human beings are political animals is found in Aristotle’s Politics 1.2.1252b–1253a. The primary meaning of this notion is that society is required to satisfy the individual’s physical needs. Maimonides’ usage of this notion in the Guide reflects this meaning. In addition, there is a secondary meaning that is mentioned by the medievals, and also hinted at by Aristotle. Humans feel a need for companionship. Maimonides alludes to this idea in the introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah. See Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Seder Zera’im, 43–45.
See Maimonides’ reference to Mohammed in his Epistle to the Jews in Yemen. There he is called, “the madman” who invented a “notorious religion.” David Hartman See Halkin and Hartman, Crisis and Leadership, 99.
This is the conclusion reached by Reines and Bland. For a reference to their studies see above, note 48. I discuss this issue in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 11–13, 79–82, 130.
For a detailed discussion of this passage see J. Kraemer, “Nomos and Shar’ia in Maimonides’ Thought [Heb.]”, Teudah, 4 (1986): 189. Though there is more than one way for interpreting this passage as Kraemer shows, it is clear that Maimonides sees the ability to govern as crucial for the preservation of the species and part of the system of divine providence. See also Avraham Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000): 165–171.
The Political Regime, Fauzi Najjar ed. (Beirut, 1964): 80–1 [An English translation of this passage has been prepared by Fauzi Najjar and appears in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy, 37].
See Guide 3.32.
I discuss this issue in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 35–41.
Genesis 25: 23.
Genesis Rabbah 63: 7.
Cf. Guide 2.6. Maimonides’ exegesis is a little more complex and problematic than my summary suggests. Genesis Rabbah 63:8 interprets the verse: And God said to her — “through the agency of an angel.” At the beginning of the chapter Maimonides cites this passage as a proof text for the view that all prophecies occur by way of an angel in a dream or a vision — the “angel” being a reference to the Active Intellect. At this juncture of his discourse, he interprets that the “angel” in this passage refers to a human being who is a prophet, rather than to the Active Intellect. Maimonides is aware of this problem and so adds a further in terpretation: an “angel” came to Eber who informed Rebecca of the prophecy.
See, for example, Maimonides’ reference to women in Guide 1.35; Laws of Repentance 10.1.
Guide 3.51.
Genesis 18: 2; 32:25; Numbers 22:22; Joshua 5:13.
For an overview of the controversy see Joseph Sarachek, Faith and Reason: The Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides (New York: Hermon Press, 1935). The issue of the allegorization of scripture in this period has received the attention of a number of scholars. See, for example, Frank Talmage, “Apples of Gold: The Inner Meaning of Sacred Texts in Medieval Judaism”, in: Arthur Green ed., Jewish Spirituality: From the Bible Through the Middle Ages, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1986): 313-55. I too have dealt with this issue in “A Fragment from the Commentary on Ruth Ascribed to R. Nissim of Marseilles”, Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought, 14 (Joseph Sermoneta Memorial Volume) (1998): 159–180.
Jeremiah 1: 11–12.
See, for example, the discussion of Alfarabi cited above: “It [the imaginative faculty] receives the intelligibles by imitating them with sensibles that it puts together, and receives the particulars, which are usually produced by practical reason through deliberation, sometimes by representing them as they are and sometimes by imitating them with other sensibles (Al-Farabi on the Perfect State, 221).”
Zechariah 11: 7.
1 Samuel 3: 4–8.
See chapter 1, “Prophecy in R. Saadiah’s Other Writings.”
For a detailed discussion of Yefet’s division of levels of prophecy see Colette Sirat, Les théories des visions surnaturelles dans la pensée juive du moyenâge (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965): 47–9; Haggai Ben-Shammai, “The Doctrines of Religious Thought of Abù Yùsuf Ya’gub al-Qirgisani and Yefet ben’ Eli [Hebrew]”, Ph.D. Thesis, Hebrew University, 1977: 268-78.
Adolf Poznanski ed., Megillat ha-Megalle von Abraham bar Chija (Berlin, 1924): 41–44. See Sirat, Les théories des visions surnaturelles, 78-82.
Several passages in Maimonides’ Epistle to the Jews of Yemen display striking similarity to Bar Hiyya’s work. See Salo Baron, “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides”, PAAJR, 6 (1935–36): 9f. For possible Karaite influences on Maimonides’ thought on this issue see Daniel J. Lasker, “The Influence of Karaism on Maimonides [Heb.]”, Sefunot, 5 (1996): 152f.
This is true also of his use of “holy spirit” in the earlier sections of the Guide; see, for example, 1.40. There he see ruah (spirit) as a term that also denotes, “the divine intellectual overflow that overflows to the prophets and in virtue of which they prophesy as we shall explain to you when speaking of prophecy (p. 90).” For a study of the “holy spirit” in Maimonides’ thought, and the distinction between this phenomenon and prophecy, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, King Solomon and Philosophical Esotericism in the Thought of Maimonides [Heb.] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996): 164–188.
B.T. Megillah 7a.
See Lasker, “The Influence of Karaism on Maimonides”, 153–56.
See Mishnah Yoma 1: 6.
Maimonides accepts the possibility of non-Jews attaining prophecy in the Epistle to the Jews of Yemen as we have seen above. The only non-Jews who are treated as prophets by Maimonides are Job and his companions, but he regards the story of Job as a parable. See Guide 3.23. For a discussion of the issue of the attainment of prophecy by non-Jews in Maimonides’ thought see Jacob Levinger, Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier [Heb.] (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1989): 21–28. The Talmud discusses the issue of non-Jews attaining prophecy in B. T. Baba Batra 15a-b.
See Avot 5.19; Genesis Rabbah 19: 11.
For a further discussion of this point see below, note 197.
See Klein-Braslavy, King Solomon and Philosophical Esotericism in the Thought of Maimonides, 166–7; see also Kasher, “Is There an Early Stratum in the Guide of the Perplexed?” 105-129.
Genesis Rabbah 50: 2.
Guide 2.6:265.
See Moses Narboni, Commentary on the Guide, J. Goldenthal ed. (Vienna, 1852): 28a [reprinted in Sheloshah Qadmonei Mefarshei Ha-Moreb (Jerusalem, 1969)].
Narboni, Shem Tov and Abrabanel present this view in their commentaries on Guide 2.45. Samuel Ibn Tibbon presents a similar view in his own name in Ma’amar Yiqqavu Ha-Mayim, M. Bisliches ed. (Pressburg, 1837): 37.
Perfect State, 218–227.
Megillat ha-Megalleh, 41–44.
The six levels in Yefet’s list are (in the following order): “mouth to mouth” (confined to Moses); the holy spirit; hearing the speech from the Glory without the mediation of a dream or vision (Samuel’s level of prophecy) a prophetic vision (most prophets); seeing an angel directly while awake and hearing the speech from it (for example, Daniel); a prophetic dream. See above, note 170. Ibn Daud, on the other hand, posits 2 basic levels of prophecy: dream prophecy in which the imagination depicts the future of a nation; vision prophecy attained by the individual while awake. These levels are divided into 2 subdivisions: the imagination depicts the future in a figurative manner; the future is depicted without employing symbols. He presents also other forms of subdivisions. While he includes examples from Moses’ prophecy in his discussion of vision prophecy, it is clear from his subsequent discussion that Moses attained a level of prophecy beyond that of all others. His alone is labeled “true revelation” for it involved the divine Law. Ibn Daud points to the public miracles that served to verify his prophecy, and more important, the audible voice that was heard also by the entire people. See S. Weil ed., Emunah Ramah (Frankfurt, 1852): 70–73, 80–81. It should be noted that he is not entirely consistent in his approach to prophecy. At times he treats the images seen by the prophet in the vision as temporary ones created by the souls of the spheres from the elements, rather than being the product of the faculty of representation.. For a discussion of Ibn Daud’s approach to prophecy see T.A.M. (Resianne) Fontaine, In Defense of Judaism: Abraham Ibn Daud (Assen / Maastricht, the Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1990): 137-167.
This interpretation is brought by Kaspi in his commentary on the Guide, Maskiyot Kesef, S. Werblunger ed. (Frankfurt, 1848): 121 [reprinted in Sheloshah Qadmonei Mefarshei Ha-Moreh].
See my “The Voice of God in Medieval Jewish Philosophic Exegesis”, 29–38. In a letter purportedly written by Maimonides’ student in his name to Hasdai Halevi, the interpretation is brought that the voice was not an audible one. Rather it symbolizes a purely intellectual apprehension that was attained by Moses as a result of joining the rank of the supernal intellects. Maimonides is said to have rejected this interpretation maintaining: “If Scripture had not taught He heard the voice (qol) speaking to him (Num. 7:89) I would have assented [to this interpretation].” See Shailat, Letters and Essays of Moses Maimonides, 680. There is doubt as to the authenticity of this letter. Even assuming it is true, it is hardly likely that the literal meaning of Scripture in this matter would have been the prime consideration in Mairnonides’ interpretation. He does not interpret the “voice” heard by the other prophets as an audible one, but the product of their imagination. The notion that “speech” (dibbur) may indicate apprehension resulting from the state of conjunction with the Active Intellect is suggested by him in Introduction to Pereq Heleq as we have seen. This notion is found already by Dunash Ibn Tamim in his Commentary on the Book of Creation. Dunash views the tripartite division of the highest of the sefirot, the Holy Spirit, into qol, ruah and dibbur as designating three levels of prophecy. The first designates the created voice, while the second dream prophecy. The third, dibbur, is confined to Moses. It designates “conjunction with the supernal soul.” See Georges Vajda, “Le commentaire kairouanais sur le Livre de la Création”, REJ, 107 (1948): 154–56.
See Guide 2.6; 3.45.
Ezekiel 8: 1–8; Genesis 15:5; Jeremiah 13:4–7; Hosea 1:2; Judges 6:37; Zechariah 11:7–13.
196-See my “A Fragment from a Commentary on Ruth”, 160–69.
In Guide 2.35 Maimonides rejects the literal interpretation of the sun and moon halting in their course for Joshua, though his primary intent in that discussion is to prove the superiority of Moses’ miracles. One is nevertheless drawn to the conclusion that Maimonides rejected any change involving the heavens. See my “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy”, 110.
The first approach is not only in harmony with a “traditional” view, but also with the view of a deterministic universe. This is the interpretation that was favored by Pines and Altmann. For a discussion of this issue see my, “The Suffering of the Righteous in Medieval Jewish Philosophy [Reb.]”, Daat, 19 (1987): 19–25.
See above, note 109.
205 Guide 3.3; cf. Ezekiel 1: 24–25. See also Maimonides’ discussion of the hashmal in 3.7.
See Charles Touati, «La problème de l’inerrance prophetique dans la théologie juive du moyen ăge», Revue de l’Histoire des Religions, 174 (1968): 169-97. I will return to this problem in the following chapter while dealing with Gersonides’ approach to prophecy (“Bible Commentaries”).
For a discussion of Maimonides’ approach to providence see in particular: Alvin Reines, “Maimonides’ Concepts of Providence and Theodicy”, HUCA, 43 (1972): 169–206; Charles Touati, «Les Deux Théories de Maimonide sur la Providence», in: S. Stein and R. Loewe eds., Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History (Alabama: Alabama University, 1979): 331–44. See also my “The Suffering of the Righteous in Medieval Jewish Philosophy”, 19–25. For a comprehensive bibliography on this subject see Jacob Israel Dienstag, “Maimonides on Providence — A Bibliography”, Daat, 20 (1988): 17–28.
Maimonides discusses the views of the Sabians at length in 3:29. These views provided him with the basis for his understanding of many of the commandments. He learnt these views primarily from a medieval work attributed to the Sabians known as the Nabatean Agriculture. See Pines, “The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed”, cxxiii–iv.
In Guide 1.35 Maimonides insists that the multitude be educated that God is incorporeal, but refrains from dealing with the angels. That the angels are in corporeal is mentioned in 1.49, and subsequently in 2.6–7. In his subsequent Treatise on Resurrection he explicitly maintains that if the masses do not accept this view of the angels they are not considered heretics. See David Hartman Halkin and Hartman, Crisis and Leadership, 215.
In Maimonides’ revised version of the thirteen principles in the Introduction to Pereq Heleq, he incorporates creation into the fourth princile. See Mishnah’ im Perush HaRambam: Neziqin, 212.
For a further discussion of this point see Maimonides’ Political Thought, 41–47,217–221.
Maimonides appears to accept belief in emanation in Guide 2.11, only to subsequently reject it in 2.22. For an attempt to reconcile between these two positions, see Arthur Hyman, “Maimonides on Creation and Emanation”, in: John F. Wippel ed., Studies in Medieval Philosophy (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1987): 45–61. I am inclined to interpret his two positions as a deliberate contradiction, rather than as compatible. I have already shown the relation Maimonides draws between his approach to prophecy and his approach to creation in my discussion of Guide 2.32.
For a detailed discussion of this parable see Hannah Kasher, “The Parable of the King’s Palace in The Guide of the Perplexed as a Directive to the Student [Heb.]”, AJS Review, 14 (1989): 1–19 [Hebrew Section].
I have dealt extensively with this ideal in Maimonides’ Political Thought, 125–158.
Maimonides’ view of providence in 3:51 has puzzled his earliest commentators. See Zevi Diesendruck, “Samuel and Moses Ibn Tibbon on Maimonides’ Theory of Providence”, HUCA, 11 (1936): 341–66. For studies dealing with Maimonides’ approach to providence see above, Alvin Reines, “Maimonides’ Concepts of Providence and Theodicy”, HUCA, 43 (1972): 169–206; Alvin Reines, “Maimonides’ Concepts of Providence and Theodicy”, HUCA, 43 (1972): 169–206 note 207.
The Neoplatonic strand of Maimonides’ thought has been discussed by Alfred Ivry, “Neoplatonic Currents in Maimonides’ Thought”, in: Joel Kraemer ed., Perspectives on Maimonides, 115–40; “Maimonides and Neoplatonism: Challenge and Response”, in: Lenn Goodman ed., Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought (New York: SUNY Press, 1992): 137–56. For a study of the term ’ishq in Maimonides see Steven Harvey, “The Meaning of Terms Designating Love in Judaeo-Arabic Thought and Some Remarks on the Judaeo-Arabic Interpretation of Maimonides”, in: Norman Golb ed., Judaeo-Arabic Studies (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997); 175–196.
For a discussion of the problem of intellection and immortality in Maimonides’ thought see above, note 109.
See above, note 138.
See my Maimonides’ Political Thought, 92, 136–150.
Abraham Heschel, “Did Maimonides Believe that He had Attained Prophecy [Heb.]”, in A. Marx, S. Lieberman, S. Spiegel, S. Zeitlin eds., Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume, (New York: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1945): 159–188.
See Levinger, Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier, 21–28.
For Maimonides’ description of the messianic period, see the references cited above,;note 89. See also Introduction to Pereq Heleq, 207-8; Guide 3.11.
For a study of the term gharìb in Maimonides’ writings see Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 158–164.
See Pines’ note in Guide of the Perplexed, 624 n.32.
See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 1–61, 189–223. See also Warren Z. Harvey, “Political Philosophy and Halakhah in Maimonides [Heb.] ”, Iyyun, 29 (1980): 198-212.
On this point I agree with David Hartman’s analysis in his Crisis and Leadership, 246f. The English translation of the treatise can be found on pages 211-233. The major point on which I disagree with Hartman is on the question whether Maimonides believed in the resurrection of the dead as literally understood. Hartman answers in the a ffirmative. He maintains that Maimonides sought to limit the significance of this belief in the minds of the Jews, not to deny its validity. On my reading of this treatise in light of the gamut of Maimonides’ writings, I would argue that he regarded resurrection as a politically necessary belief, but not, literally speaking, a true one. There are many hints in the Treatise on Resurrection that it contains an esoteric level pointing to this conclusion. The only “resurrection” that takes place is the immortality of the perfect intellect. A full discussion of this issue is outside the scope of this chapter.
See Crisis and Leadership, 215.
Guide 3.29.
The translation is my own based on the text of the treatise in Shailat, Letters and Essays of Moses Maimonides, 335 (Hebrew translation, 368–9).
See Maimonides’ Political Thought, 221–3.
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Moses Ben Maimon, R. (2001). The Guide of the Perplexed. In: Prophecy. Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0820-4_4
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