Abstract
In footnote 122 of his ‘History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions’, Imre Lakatos states, “Let me point out here that the methodology of research programmes may be applied not only to norm-impregnated historical knowledge but to any normative knowledge, including even ethics and aesthetics.” He goes on to suggest that such an application would supersede the naive falsificationist ‘quasi-empirical’ approach as carried out by J. W. N. Watkins in his ‘Negative Utilitarianism’. In this article I shall attempt to show that a rational reconstruction of at least some theories in normative ethics is possible.1 Professor Lakatos’ criterion of rationality is based on his criterion of demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Hence, I shall begin my argument by exposing the latter criterion.
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Notes
An earlier version of this paper was read at the eastern division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December 1973. The generous help in the preparation of this paper given me by Imre Lakatos before his regrettable and untimely death, as well as that of J. W. N. Watkins, J. Howard Sobel, Keith Gunderson, Theodore Drange and Ralph Clark is most gratefully acknowledged. The article by Lakatos quoted above appeared in Buck, Roger C. and Cohen, Robert S. (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1971, p. 132. Watkins’ article appeared in the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 37 (1963), 95–114.
Imre Lakatos, ‘Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 118.
This does not, however, imply that a research program is neither true nor false in any sense. It might be further mentioned that Lakatos differs from traditional conventionalism in basically three ways: first, he is a radical conventionalist in that he not only rejects the possibility of theories being proven true or false, but also of basic statements being proven true or false. Second, the decision to accept or reject a theory is not left up to common sense or some type of subjective taste, but is sternly regulated by clear-cut, objective rules. Finally, Lakatos does posit an extra-methodological inductive principle in an attempt to tie up acceptance and rejection with verisimilitude. [For more on this final point see Imre Lakatos, ‘Popper on Demarcation and Induction’, in H. Lenk (ed.), Neue Aspekte der Wissenschaftstheorie, Vieweg 1971, Section 2, b.]
Variations of this counter example have appeared many times in philosophical literature. I believe the first appearance was in W. D. Ross’s, The Right and The Good, Oxford, 1930, pp. 34–39.
The first reaction to it came from W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, ‘Two Problems about Duty’, Mind, 41 (1932), 145–172.
In more recent times it can be found in J. J. C. Smart, ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’, Philosophical Quarterly 6;
D. H. Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism, Oxford 1967; Jan Narveson, ‘The Desert Island Problem’, Analysis 23, 63; and James Cargile, ‘Utilitarianism and the Desert Island Problem’, Analysis 25, 23–24.
For an interesting discussion of the counter example move by normative ethical theorists see Richard W. Eggerman, ‘Moral Theory and Practicality’, Ethics 84, 78–85. This is an extremely interesting move. It suggests that there are certain cases in which no theory is needed to make an ethical judgment and that, in these cases, an ethical theorist is actually willing to consider the possibility that his theory is false. It is similar to the move made by the scientist who accepts the fact that there are certain cases which are so simple that we can judge as to the truth or falsity of statements describing these cases without appealing to a high level theory and who is willing to agree that such a case may provide an anomaly to his theory. It is the above described move by the ethical theorist which, I believe, more than anything else suggests the objectivity of ethical data. It calls to mind the words of Popper that: “It is only the idea of truth which allows us to speak sensibly of mistakes and of rational criticism and which makes rational discussion possible — that is, to say, critical discussion in search of mistakes with the serious purpose of eliminating as many of these mistakes as we can, in order to get nearer to the truth. Thus the very idea of error — and of fallibility — involves the idea of an objective truth as the standard of which we may fall short.” Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Harper & Row, 1963, p. 229.
Using imaginary experiments with ideal type cases for the purpose of testing a theory is by no means foreign to either the social or physical sciences. For a thoughtful discussion of the use of imaginary experiments in science see Thomas Kuhn, ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, in Melanges Alexandre Koyre, L’Aventure De L’esprit, Vol. II (ed. by Rene Taton and M. Cohen), Hermann, 1964, pp. 307–323.
It is interesting to note the similarity between the basic statements of ethics and the basic statements of linguistics as described by Noam Chomsky in Chapter I, Part 7 of his Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, M.I.T. Press, 1965.
Some Utilitarians who used to take counter examples seriously appear now to be changing their minds. J. J. C. Smart, for example, in ‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’ (J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge University Press, 1973) states: “It is also necessary to remember that we are considering utilitarianism as a normative system. The fact that it has consequences which conflict with some of our particular moral judgments need not be decisive against it. In science general principles must be tested by reference to particular facts of observation. In ethics we may well take the opposite attitude, and test our particular moral attitudes by reference to more general ones.” Smart is somewhat ambivalent about this claim, however, as he later states: “The utilitarian, then, will test his particular feelings by reference to his general principle, and not the general principle by reference to his particular feelings. Now while I have some tendency to take this point of view I have also some tendency to feel the opposite, that we should sometimes test our general principles by how we feel about particular applications of them.” Further, he does give serious consideration to a number of counter examples that historically have plagued utilitarianism. I believe Smart’s real worry is not about what I have called “ethical basic statements” but rather about what he calls “the common moral consciousness”.
In his ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’ (Phillipa Foot, Theories of Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1967) Smart states: “How are we to decide the issue between extreme and restricted utilitarianism? I wish to repudiate at the outset that milk and water approach which describes itself sometimes as ‘investigating what is implicit in the common moral consciousness’ and sometimes as ‘investigating how people ordinarily talk about morality’. We have only to read the newspaper correspondence about capital punishment or about what should be done with Formosa to realize that the common moral consciousness is in part made up of superstitious elements, of morally bad elements, and of logically confused elements. I address myself to goodhearted and benevolent people and so I hope that if we rid ourselves of the logical confusion the superstitious and morally bad elements will largely fall away. For even among goodhearted and benevolent people it is possible to find superstitious and morally bad reasons for moral beliefs. These superstitious and morally bad reasons hide behind the protective screen of logical confusion. With people who are not logically confused but who are openly superstitious or morally bad I can of course do nothing. That is, our ultimate pro-attitudes may be different. Nevertheless I propose to rely on my own moral consciousness and to appeal to your moral consciousness and to forget about what people ordinarily say.” The idea stated in the last sentence of this quote is reiterated in Smart’s ‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’: “In setting up a system of normative ethics the utilitarian must appeal to some ultimate attitudes which he holds in common with those people to whom he is addressing himself.” What I have called “ethical basic statements” have little to do with the ‘common moral consciousness’ but, I suspect, a good deal to do with Smart’s readers who are primarily normative ethical theorists. Smart’s position does not, therefore, appear to be inconsistent with the position I am suggesting.
Of course, the ethical subjectivist might claim that even if one could call the conclusions of ethical counter examples “basic,” they still differ from the basic statements of science in that the agreement on ethical counter examples is not objective. This position is usually stated in one of two ways: A. Whereas non-scientists may disagree concerning the basic statements of science, they could be brought to agreement if they were apprised of all the facts and trained to be competent observers, while it is logically possible for two people to be apprised of all of the facts and still disagree about a basic value judgment. B. Whereas non-scientists may disagree concerning the basic statements of science, they could be brought to agreement if they were apprised of all the facts and trained to be competent observers, while it is physically possible for two people to be apprised of all the facts and still disagree about basic value judgments. Both of these subjectivist claims are far too strong as we could not even have objective basic statements in science if we could only admit statements which pass these tests. Concerning claim A, it is by no means difficult to conceive of a case in which two irrational, stubborn people disagree over some simple basic statement in, for example, physics which everyone in the research area readily accepts. With respect to claim B, there is no evidence which would rule out the physical possibility of two observers who meet the conditions specified in B disagreeing over a basic statement in science. Further, even if such an occurrence did take place (and, I would suggest, it does take place a lot more than most people realize) we surely would not say that the basic statements of science are not objective. One might respond here by weakening the ethical subjectivist position in the following way: whereas with respect to the basic statements of science it is generally the case that most reasonable, medically sound, trained observers, when well informed about all relevant information and after careful observation, will agree on their truth or falsity, with respect to the basic statements of ethics it is often the case that two reasonable, medically sound, trained observers who are well informed of all the relevant facts and have carefully considered the case, will disagree concerning their truth or falsity. Put in this way, the oft camouflaged empirical content of the subjectivist claim becomes transparent and the question readily leaps to mind “How could such a claim ever be empirically established?” Of course the answer to this question also comes quickly: “By the evidence provided by Cultural Value Relativism.” This answer, however, will not do. For, cultural value relativists have come nowhere near to proving a claim such as the one set forth above. First, although there is much data on moral disagreement, there is none concerning disagreement over simple moral judgments in ideal cases such as those found in ethical counter examples. Rather, cultural value relativists look for moral agreement with respect to such complex and sophisticated concepts as happiness, justice, killing, etc. Consider what would happen in an analogous situation where a physiologist was attempting to show that all ‘normal’ people agree with respect to color judgments. He would immediately run into insurmountable problems if he began his study by asking questions about such sophisticated color difference as that between puce and maroon. [For further elucidation of just such problems see B. Berlin and P. Kay, Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution, University of California, 1971.] Second, in the revised subjectivist hypothesis we have the occurrence of such concepts as ‘reasonable,’ ‘medically sound,’ ‘trained observer,’ ‘well informed,’ ‘carefully considered,’ etc., and, I would ask, when has any program of cultural value relativism ever incorporated any concepts such as these (except possibly “being well informed concerning all the relevant data”) into a research program? Although such criteria are never used, they are surely important. Consider again our case of the physiological research program in color agreement. Surely such a program would never get off the ground if the researcher could not ‘select out’ those who were irrational-bordering-on-insane, or those who were color-blind, or those who did not know what to look at when asked to look at a color or those who had such a short attention span that they couldn’t look at a color carefully. All of these factors would be essential for such research. One might ask at this point “But what could ever count as selecting criteria in such a research program?” Possible answers to this question have been proposed repeatedly throughout the history of ethics.
An ethical ‘observer’ must: be clear about the concepts involved in the case under consideration (E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking, Clarendon Press, 1947, pp. 5–6.), have knowledge of all the relevant facts
(W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 17.), be impartial
(E. F. Carritt, for example, declares that most men are prejudiced by their personal moral beliefs in his Ethical and Political Thinking, op. cit., p. 8. Also see Roderick Firth, ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12, 338.), be disinterested and unemotional
(R. Firth, op. cit., p. 342.), and/or have sufficient moral maturity (W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, 1930, p. 78; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Martin Oswald, Trans., Bobbs Merrill, 1962, pp. 160 and 167.). Some of these criteria have even been worked out in scientific research programs.
(See for example the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, ‘Stages and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization’, in D. Goslein (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, Rand McNally, 1969, p. 352;
Lawrence Kohlberg, ‘The Hierarchical Nature of Stages of Moral Judgment’, in L. Kohlberg and E. Ruriel (eds.), Recent Research in Moral Judgment, Holt, Rineholt and Winston, 1971;
Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of a Child, Free Press, 1948.) Of course, one might further ask “How could such theories of ‘observation’ ever be independently tested without presupposing some ethical theory?” This question requires a two-part answer. First, it is true that such theories could never be independently tested. This is not, however, a situation peculiar to ethics. For, as has been pointed out by Lakatos, no theory ever confronts reality alone but only in the context of a research program. Ethical theories of ‘observation’ would have to be embedded in a research program of cultural value absolutism. Such a research program might present simple, ideal type cases (such as those put forth in ethical counter examples), disqualify those in a culture (possibly a whole culture) who do not meet the ‘observational’ requirements, and then see if uniform responses are obtained. Of course, it must test its disqualification judgments from time to time to show that it has disqualified the right people for the right reasons. That is, if an ‘observational’ theory declares that Mr. X disagrees with judgments concerning ideal case Y because he is in imperfect ‘observational’ state Z, it must be the case that if Mr. X is brought out of ‘observational’ state Z into a normal ‘observational’ state, Mr. X will come to agree about the status of ideal case Y. Such a research program of cultural value absolutism would naturally meet anomalies, that is, cases in which it could not account for ethical disagreements over basic statement type examples. Its success or failure, as with other scientific research programs, would depend on how it deals with these anomalies; that is, if in the course of its testing it generates new auxiliary hypotheses which account for the anomalies and result in the prediction and discovery of novel anthropological, sociological or psychological facts. It should now be noted that in the above description of a possible research program which has embedded in it theories of ethical ‘observation,’ at no point is the truth of a normative ethical theory presupposed. This then, is the second part of the answer to the question mentioned above; the testing of ethical ‘observation’ theories in no way presupposes the truth or falsity of a normative ethical theory.
A. K. Stout, ‘But Suppose Everybody Did the Same’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 32, 24.
Ibid., pp. 34–35. For a more thorough discussion of some of the psychological and sociological theories that underlie utilitarianism see Rolf Sartorius, ‘Individual Conduct and Social Norms: A Utilitarian Account’, Ethics 82, 200–218. It is interesting to note that whereas act utilitarianism takes care of a counter example by putting forth novel empirical hypotheses concerning rule following behavior, rule utilitarianism simply gives a semantical reinterpretation of the utilitarian principle which decreases the empirical content of the utilitarian program and hence results in a theoretically degenerating problem shift. For an obvious example of this ‘ad hoc’ strategy by some rule utilitarians see R. F. Harrod, ‘Utilitarianism Revised’, Mind 45, 148.
Prediction and Optimal Decision, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961, p. viii.
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D’Amour, G. (1976). Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics. In: Cohen, R.S., Feyerabend, P.K., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1451-9_9
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