Abstract
Knowledge is not perception, Socrates is supposed to have proved to Theaetetus, since knowledge must be both incorrigible and (of the) real. But perception, insofar as it is incorrigible, is not of the real: it is just what seems to me now; and insofar as it is, or claims to be, of the real, it is not incorrigible: our senses, as purveyors of information, may err. So knowledge is not perception. So at least runs the traditional interpretation, which I am following here for the purpose of my argument. For the point is that even if we admit the defeat of the thesis that knowledge is perception, we still want to claim that perception is one kind of, and indeed the primordial, and fundamental, type of knowledge. For the senses are our only source of informational input from the world; without them we could know nothing. Perhaps we may drop one of Plato’s criteria (as we are taking them to be), claim that knowledge is of the real, but not incorrigible, and so admit perception to the class of cognitive activities. Perception is the most fundamental type of knowledge, on which others build, and they are all fallible: there should be, on principle, no difficulty in the case. Still, recurrent puzzles about perception have their good grounds, and I would like to try to sort out once more, very simply, some of the features that produce these puzzles.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
R. L. Gregory, ‘Perceptions as Hypotheses’ (preprint). Cf. R. L. Gregory, The Intelligent Eye, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1970, pp. 126–129.
Rolf George, ‘The Thing in Itself and Kant’s Transcendental Object’, paper presented at the 1974 Kant Congress. I am very grateful to Professor George for letting me read his MS; in fact I owe to his clear formulation there the awareness of the distinction between the ‘causal’ and referential aspects of perception and of the philosophical import of this distinction (or of its neglect).
R. L. Gregory, op. cit. In The Intelligent Eye, Gregory speaks of ‘object hypotheses’, e. g. on pp. 64, 69–72, 150.
Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Quantifiers, Language Games and Transcendental Arguments’, in Logic, Language Games and Information, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, pp. 98–122.
J. J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1966.
Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Information, Causality and the Logic of Perception’, preprint.
Cf. ‘People and Other Animals’, below.
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958; The Tacit Dimension, Doubleday, New York, 1966.
Discussed in M. Polanyi, ‘Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading’, in Knowing and Being, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969, pp. 181–207, especially 198–199, ref. on p. 207. Much further empirical support for this general approach to perception can also be found in the works of Hans Wallach and his collaborators.
Cf. e. g. Hans Wallach and David Huntington, ‘Counteradaptation after Exposure to Displaced Visual Direction, Perception and Psychophysics 13 (1973) 519–524, as well as Gregory’s work.
Along with the reading of Professor George’s manuscript mentioned above, this paper owes its inception to a discussion with Tom Kuhn, who is seeking (if I understand him) a theory of perception that will provide both realism and incorrigibility. I don’t suppose my argument will convince him, but I am grateful to him too for making me try. Professor Lorenz Krueger read the manuscript and made some very apt suggestions, and it was Professor Michael Frede, who also read the manuscript, who warned me against uncritical acceptance of the Cornford interpretation of the Theaetetus. Since I was using it only as a framework for my own argument, however, I have allowed my report of it to stand with only slight modifications; classical scholars may take my Plato for a fictional character if they like. I am grateful to both Professors Krueger and Frede also for their careful reading and criticism.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Grene, M. (1974). Three Aspects of Perception. In: The Understanding of Nature. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2224-8_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2224-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0463-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2224-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive