Abstract
In Chapter 2, following Habermas and Apel, we introduced the concept of communicative rationality in contrast to the traditional notion of cognitive rationality, and formulated some of its basic principles deemed to be relevant to our program. In addition to the rules or principles already discussed by our philosophical contemporaries in Germany, we formulated one more principle called “the principle of choice between incompatible alternatives” (or “choice principle”). We also incorporated the Apelian-Habermasian concept of “ performative contradiction” into what we call The Principle of Performative Consistency (PPC), so that a refutation of a validity claim can be realized by showing that, similar to what is called the “ indirect proof in formal logic, making such a claim violates PPC.
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Notes
Marvin Farber: Naturalism and Subjectivism (Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1959), p. 6.
In Thomas M. Olshewsky’s Foundations of Moral Decisions: a Dialogue (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1985), “ David” argues for the distinction between “ the world of reasons” and “ the world of causes” (pp. 12-13). But when he claims that decisions made according to reason are uncaused, he amounts to saying that a reason can play the role of a cause. This is not what we want to accept here. We only want to say that to offer a reason is not the same as to give a causal explanation. In other words, we do not care about causality when we justify what we do argumentatively.
D. C. Mathur, Naturalistic Philosophies of Experience: Studies in James, Dewey and Farber against the Background of Husserl’s Phenomenology (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1971), p. 8.
Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective, trans, by Georgia Warnke (Cambridge: The MTI Press), 1984, pp. 238–239.
Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective, trans, by Georgia Warnke (Cambridge: The MTI Press), 1984, p. 239.
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 82.
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 82.
Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), p. 1.
Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” found in his Mortal Questions (London and New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979).
Ayn Rand, “Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?” in The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought, ed. Leonard Peikoff (New York: The Penguin Group, 1990), pp. 18–19.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macqarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 269–270.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macqarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 321.
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Zhai, Z. (1994). Meaning, Ideality and Subjectivity. In: The Radical Choice and Moral Theory. Analecta Husserliana, vol 45. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0501-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0501-9_4
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