Abstract
Professor Carl G. Hempel argues in his ‘The theoretician’s dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction’1 that a scientific theory establishes not only deductive relationships but also inductive relationships among observational sentences, and that the new theory reconstructed by means of Craigian method from a theory fails to preserve all those inductive relationships. In the present article, Hempel’s argument is analyzed in detail and rejected.
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References
Bohnert, H. G.: 1968, ‘In defense of Ramsey’s elimination method’, The Journal of Philosophy LXV, 275–281.
Hempel, C. G.: 1965, Theoretician’s dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction’, in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science ,New York, pp. 173–226.
Hesse, M.: 1970, Theories and transitivity of confirmation’, Philosophy of Science 37, 50–63.
Niiniluoto, I. and Tuomela, R.: 1973, Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference ,Holland.
Schlesinger, G.: 1974, Confirmation and Confirmability ,Oxford.
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Lin, CH. (1993). Hempel on Inductive Shortcomings in Craigian Method. In: Lin, CH., Fu, D. (eds) Philosophy and Conceptual History of Science in Taiwan. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 141. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2500-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2500-0_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5103-3
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