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Worlds and States of Affairs: How Similar Can They be?

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Language, Truth and Ontology

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 51))

Abstract

A state of affairs is a partial world. Alternatively, a world is a maximal state of affairs. In this paper, I want to consider a proposal due to Nathan Salmon about how fine-grained the ontologies of worlds and states of affairs are.’ One natural way of thinking of worlds and states of affairs is as constructs out of objects and properties.’ I will argue that Salmon’s proposal fails because it presupposes an incoherent conception of what an object is.

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Notes

  1. See Salmon, `Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints’, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism, French et al (eds.), Minnesota University Press 1986, pp. 75–120, and `The Logic of What Might Have Been’, The Philosophical Review 98 (1989) 3–34.

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  2. I give a formal theory of states of affairs in my Languages of Possibility, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1988, Ch.5. A simplified version is to be found in my `Truth, Correspondence and Redundancy’, in Fact,Science and Morality: Essays on Language, Truth and Logic, Macdonald, G. and Wright, C. (eds.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986.

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  3. I take this nomenclature from the title of the paper `Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles’ by T. J. McKay, in French et al,op. cit. pp. 295–304. I hope to discuss McKay’s challenge to CS elsewhere.

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  4. The example is originally from `Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions’ by Roderick Chisholm, Noûs 1 (1968) 1–8.

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  5. See ‘The Logic of What Might Have Been’, especially Section III.

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  6. I argue in Ch. 2 of Languages of Possibility that the best motivations for possibilism, if accepted by a modalist, would inevitably drive her towards anti-modalism.

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  7. See Ch. 4 of Languages of Possibility for a defence of this remark.

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  8. This kind of reduction of the extensional to the intensional was pioneered by Kit Fine. See e.g. his `Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse’ in Alvin Plantinga, edited by James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, Reidel 1985.

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  9. Here I generally follow Wiggins, though he would be dubious about the application of his apparatus to artefacts such as chairs. See his Sameness and Substance, Basil Blackwell 1985, Ch. 5

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  10. See On The Plurality of Worlds by David Lewis, Basil Blackwell 1986, p.20.

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  11. See his ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’, The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979) 5–26.

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  12. Adams’ example is consistent with CS since the globes of u and v are constituted of different iron.

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  13. This is my response to David Kaplan’s remark that ‘for individuals not extant during an overlap…tracing back to the common part and comparing…[is] unavailing’. See his ’Quantifying In’, in Words and Objections, Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. (eds.), Reidel 1969, at p.224.

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  14. See his review of The Metaphysics of Modality, in The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988) 329–37.

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  15. No great changes are needed in (3) to make it consistent with Figure1: given a criterion of isolation, the total states quantified over can be restricted to states which do not draw upon isolated parts.

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  16. See ‘Can We Dispense with Space-Time?’ by Hartry Field, in Proceedings of the 1984 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association edited by P. Asquith and P. Kitcher, fn. 14.

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  17. In writing this paper, I have benefited from discussion and correspondence with Jonathan Lowe, Nathan Salmon, Jim Stone and Stephen Yablo.

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Kevin Mulligan

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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Forbes, G. (1992). Worlds and States of Affairs: How Similar Can They be?. In: Mulligan, K. (eds) Language, Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 51. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2602-1_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2602-1_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5149-1

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