Abstract
In a short but important article,1 the Polish philosopher Izydora Dąmbska criticised the thesis — endorsed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński2 — that there are ‘empty’ terms which denote no objects at all, besides the usual general and singular terms. Dąmbska remarked that “we usually find cited as examples of empty names such self-contradictory names as’ square circle’ or’ son of a childless mother’, or names of mythical deities — fictitious figures that exist only in legends, poems, novels, etc.”3 She also pointed out, however, that the basic semantic function of names consists in denoting. This means that, if we admit the concept of a name which denotes nothing, either we arbitrarily change the meaning of the term ‘name’ or run into contradiction. In fact, she observed, “for the everyday interpretation of the term ‘name’, a name which does not denote anything is practically a non-name”.4
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Notes
I. Dąmbska, ‘Concerning the So-Called Empty Names’, in J. Pelc (ed.): Semiotics in Poland: 1894–1969, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Boston, 1979, pp. 126–130. The paper was originally published in Polish in 1948.
T. Kotarbinski, Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, Pergamon Press, Oxford-London, 1966, pp. 389–409.
I. Dąmbska, op. cit., p. 126.
ibid., p. 127.
ibid.
W.V. Quine, ‘On What There Is’, in W.V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)-London, 1980, 4th pr., pp. 1–19; Word and Object, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 1960; ‘Ontological Relativity’, in W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York-London, 1969, pp. 26–68.
For a more detailed analysis of Quine’s stance see M. Marsonet, Science, Reality, and Language, State University of New York Press, Albany (NY), 1995.
W.V. Quine, ‘On What There Is’, cit., p. 4.
See P. Davies, J. Gribbin, The Matter Myth, Simon & Schuster, New York-London, 1992.
I. Dąjnbska, ibid.
The distinction biological/cultural evolution is clearly stated in N. Rescher, A Useful Inheritance: Evolutionary Aspects of the Theory of Knowledge, Rowman & Littlefield, Savage (MD), 1990. See also M. Marsonet, The Primacy of Practical Reason. An Essay on Nicholas Rescher’s Philosophy, University Press of America, Lanham-New York-London, 1996.
For a definition of this expression see W. Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London-New York, 1963, pp. 1–40.
I. Dąmbska, ibid., p. 130.
J. Woleński, Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 270.
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Marsonet, M. (1998). Dąmbska, Quine, and the So-Called Empty Names. In: Kijania-Placek, K., Woleński, J. (eds) The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy. Synthese Library, vol 273. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5108-5_16
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