Abstract
My reason for contributing this, rather than some other, paper to this volume is that its central idea came to my mind in the course of a discussion with Richard Brandt when he was in Oxford in 1974 to give the John Locke Lectures — one out of many fruitful and enjoyable discussions which I have had with all three of the honorands. Since it bears in different ways on the interests of them all, I hope that they may find it an acceptable offering, although it does not mention their work directly and their names do not appear in the notes. Certainly no one could write anything informed about moral philosophy without taking into account the writings of this extraordinary constellation of talent.
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Notes
Printed in my Essays on Philosophical Method (London, Macmillan, 1971; Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972).
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 131.
See my review, Ph. Q. 12 (1962), p. 353.
Cf. P.R. Foot, ‘Moral Beliefs’, Proc. of Arist. Soc. 59 (1958/9).
Cf. G.J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London, Macmillan, 1967), p. 67.
See my ‘Descriptivism’, Proc. of Br. Acad. 49 (1963), reproduced in my Essays on the Moral Concepts (London, Macmillan and Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), sec. 7.
See my review of G.J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, Mind 77 (1968).
See my *Wrongness and Harm’, in my Essays on the Moral Concepts.
See my Freedom and Reason (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963), ch. 4 and my ‘Prediction and Moral Appraisal’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 3 (1978).
‘Universalisability’,Proc. of Arist. Soc. 55 (1954/5).
‘A Note to the Paralogisms’, in G. Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy (Oxford, Oriel Press, 1976).
For the relation between wanting and sincerely prescribing see my Freedom and Reason, p. 111; ‘Wanting: Some Pitfalls’, in R. Binkley et al. (eds.) Agent, Action and Reason (Toronto, Toronto U.P. and Oxford, Blackwell, 1971), repr. in my Practical Inferences (London, Macmillan, 1971; Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972).
See my ‘Principles’, Proc. of Arist. Soc. 73 (1972/3) and ‘Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism’, in H.D. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy 4 (London, Allen and Unwin, 1976).
See ‘Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism’, cited above.
Ibid., p. 125.
For the distinction between universality and generality see my ‘Principles’, cited above.
See my ‘Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism’, cited above, pp. 123 f.
See my Freedom and Reason, ch. 2.
It would be tedious to complicate this remark in order to cover moral and other statements which are not of subject-predicate form; but it could be done.
This is explained more fully and accurately in my Freedom and Reason, ch. 2.
Cf. D.P. Gauthier, ‘Hare’s Debtors’, Mind 77 (1968).
pp. 100 ff.
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Hare, R.M. (1978). Relevance. In: Goldman, A.I., Kim, J. (eds) Values and Morals. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7634-5_5
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