Abstract
The detailed investigation of intentionality stands as a major achievement in 20th Century philosophy. This focus upon the ability of subjectivity to be directed toward and occupied with objects different from itself should, however, not obscure the fact that it has another important, but apparently antithetical feature, namely self-awareness. Obviously I can be aware of blooming trees, rainy mornings or the cries of playing children, but I can also be aware that these are seen, smelled and heard, that different perceptions are taking place, and that I am the one experiencing them, just as I might be aware that I am hungry, tired or happy.1
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Notes
Let me emphasize that it is not only legitimate to speak of self-awareness when I realize that / am perceiving a candle, but also when I am aware of my feeling of sorrow, or my burning pain, or my perception of a candle, that is, whenever I am acquainted with an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness. I am entitled to speak of self-awareness the moment I am no longer simply conscious of a foreign object, but of my experience of the object as well, for in this case my subjectivity reveals itself to me.
Cf. M. Frank, Was ist Neostrukturalismus? (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1984);
Cf. M. Frank, Die Unhintergehbarkeit von Individualität (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1986);
Cf. M. Frank, Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1989);
Cf. M. Frank, Zeitbewußtsein (Pfullingen: Neske, 1990);
Cf. M. Frank, Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1991a);
Cf. M. Frank, Selbstbewußtseinstheorien von Fichte bis Sartre (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991b).
Frank 1984, 357.
Frank 1991b, 428, 529.
Cf. D. Henrich, “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht” in D. Henrich & H. Wagner (eds): Subjektivität und Metaphysik. Festschrift für Wolf gang Cramer (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1966), 188–232;
Cf. D. Henrich, “Selbstbewußtsein, kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie” in Bubner, Cramer, Wiehl (eds.): Hermeneutik und Dialektik (Tübingen, 1970), 257–284;
K. Cramer, “‘Erlebnis.’ Thesen zu Hegels Theorie des Selbstbewußtseins mit Rücksicht auf die Aporien eines Grundbegriffs nachhegelscher Philosophie,” in H.-G. Gadamer (ed.): Stuttgarter Hegel-Tage 1970 (Bonn, 1974), 537–603;
U. Pothast, Über einige Fragen der Selbstbeziehung (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1971).
Frank 1986, 34, 61, Frank 1991a, 71, 405, Frank 1991b, 597. Actually Frank explicitly denies that self-awareness is a “présence à soi” since he takes this expression to designate a kind of self-presentification which is completely indebted to the reflection model (Frank 1989, 488, 1991a, 24). However, it seems difficult to find a more perfect candidate for a pure unmediated self-presence than the completely irrelational self-acquaintance described by Frank, which is so close to itself that every kind of mediation is excluded.
Frank 1991a, 7, 161, Frank 1991b, 438.
Cf. Henrich 1966, 231, Henrich 1970, 261; Frank 1986, 44–45, 50, Frank 1991b, 530, 536, 557, 562; Cramer 1974, 584, 590, 592.
M. Henry, L’essence de la manifestation (Paris: P.U.F., 1963);
M. Henry, Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps (Paris: P.U.F., 1965);
M. Henry, “Le concept d’âme a-t-il un sens?” Revue philosophique de Louvain 64 (1966), 5–33;
M. Henry, “Philosophie et subjectivité,” in Jacob (ed.): Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, Bd.L: L’univers philosophique (Paris: P.U.F., 1989), 46–56;
M. Henry, Phénoménologie matérielle (Paris: P.U.F., 1990);
M. Henry, “Phénoménologie de la naissance” Alter 2 (1994), 295–312;
M. Henry, C’est moi la vérité (Paris: Seuil, 1996).
Henry 1989, 50.
Henry 1963, 14, 32, 64, 67, Henry 1966, 5.
Henry 1963, 36, 50.
Henry 1963, 44, 279, 329, 352, Henry 1966, 22–23.
Henry 1963, 47, 52, 168–169, 173.
Henry 1963, 288–292, 301.
Henry 1963, 578, 580, 590.
Henry 1963, 576, 349, 858.
Henry 1990, 166, Henry 1966, 33, Henry 1965, 139.
Henry 1990, 33–34. Cf. Hua X, 89, 110–111, 119, XI, 337. Page references are to the Husserliana edition. When referring to Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts the last number always refers to the original page in shorthand.
Henry 1990, 32.
Henry 1990, 49–50.
Henry 1990, 107.
Henry 1990, 130.
Cf. F.-D. Sebbah, “Aux limites de Pintentionnalité: M. Henry et E. Lévinas lecteurs des Leçons sur la conscience intime du temps” Alter 2 (1994), 252.
Henry 1994, 303–304, 310, Henry 1996, 201–202.
Henry 1990, 72, Henry 1963, 279–280, 351, 352, 377, 419.
Henry 1963, 58, 396, Henry 1990, 111.
Henry 1990, 7.
Henry 1963, 477.
Henry 1963, 53, 480–482, 490, 549, Henry 1990, 125, 164.
Henry 1963, 53, 57, 550, 555.
This title evokes Heidegger’s remark in Sein und Zeit concerning the necessity of analyzing the phenomena which remain hidden from view, and when he says that it is exactly Being which is the most concealed (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1986), 35. Cf. J.-L. Marion, Réduction et donation (Paris: P.U.F., 1989), 90–97.
I am not implying that alterity, difference and fracture are all one and the same. But each of these notions constitutes problems for Frank’s and Henry’s theories.
J. Derrida, La voix et le phénomène (Paris: P.U.F., 1967a);
J. Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967c);
E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973);
E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie II (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952);
E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie II (1923–24) (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959);
E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962);
E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893–1917) (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966);
E. Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966);
E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973);
E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973);
E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973);
E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985).
M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1945);
M. Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1960a);
M. Merleau-Ponty, Les relations avec autrui chez l’enfant (Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1960b);
M. Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible (Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1964);
M. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens (Paris: Les Éditions Nagel, 1966);
M. Merleau-Ponty, La prose du monde (Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1969).
J.-P. Sartre, “Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi.” Bulletin Soc. Franc, de Philosophie XLII (1948), 49–91;
J.-P. Sartre, La transcendance de l’ego (Paris: J. Vrin, 1936/1988);
J.-P. Sartre, L’être et le néant (Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1943/1976).
Merleau-Ponty 1945, 431–432, 485, 487, 492, Merleau-Ponty 1966, 164–165. Cf. Sartre 1943, 212, Sartre 1936, 23–24.
Hua XV, 128, 375, XIII, 406, 459, XIV, 51–52, 337, IV, 356, Ms. E III 2 5a, Ms. E III 2 23a. I thank the director of the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, Belgium, Professor R. Bernet, for permission to quote from Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts.
Ms. E III 2 22a. Cf. Ms. C 6 4b. Of course, it remains necessary to distinguish the alterity of the hyletic material from the alterity of the Other, and it is important to counter the suggestion that we are simply dealing with two different types or manifestations of one and the same alterity. But in the present context, this separate problem can be put aside.
Hua XIV, 379.
Hua XIV, 14. Needless to say, this should not be interpreted in a realistic vein. That which I am affected by is different from me, but it is not ontologically independent of me. Quite to the contrary: When Husserl says that the hyle as the core of interpretations, sense-formations, feelings and drives is inseparable from the ego, he is also saying that the hyle has no place outside of subjectivity. Nevertheless the hyle remains foreign. It is a domain in me which escapes my control, since it is pre-given without any active participation or contribution by the ego (Hua XIII, 427, XI 386). Husserl speaks of an interior non-egological dimension, which surrounds and affects the ego (Ms. E IE 2 22b). It is an immanent type of alterity which manifests itself directly in subjectivity, which belongs intrinsically to subjectivity, and which subjectivity cannot do without. Both are, as Husserl says, inseparable, both are irreducible structural moments in the process of constitution, in the process of bringing to appearance. For a more detailed analysis of this aspect of Husserl’s philosophy see D. Zahavi, “Self-awareness and affection” in Depraz and Zahavi (eds.): Alterity and Facticity. New Perspectives on Husserl (Dordrect: Kluwer, 1998).
Hua XIV, 245. Cf. Hua XIII, 92, 170, XIV, 51.
Huai, 28, Ms. LI 15 3a, Husserl 1985, 76.
Hua XI, 137, Ms. A V 5 7a, Ms. L 117 9b, Ms. C 3 42a.
E. Lévinas, En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: Vrin, 1949), 154.
Hua X, 107.
HuaX, 80, 83, 117–118.
Hua IV, 58, Xm, 386.
Hua IV, 147.
Hua XIV, 75, XV, 297, 301.
Hua XIV, 75, Ms. D 12 III 14, 19.
Hua XV, 300, XIV, 457, 462, IX, 197, Xffl, 263. According to Husserl, it is this double-appearance of the body, this remarkable interplay between ipseity and alterity characterizing our bodily self-awareness, which enables us to recognize embodied Others as other subjects (HuaVIII, 62).
J. Benoist, Autour de Husserl (Paris: Vrin, 1994), 57, 61;
R. Bernet, La vie du sujet (Paris: P.U.F., 1994), 321;
P. Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990), 380.
Ms. C 16 68a. Cf. Ms. C 10 2b.
Sartre 1943, 212, 1936, 23–24.
Sartre 1943, 28.
Sartre 1943, 162.
Sartre 1943, 27, 214–215.
Sartre 1943, 179. Cf. Sartre 1943, 213, 258 and Sartre 1936, 28.
Sartre 1943, 178.
J. Rosenberg, “Apperception and Sartre’s Pre-Reflective Cogito,” American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981), 257.
Sartre 1943, 115.
Sartre 1943, 115–116.
Sartre 1943, 33.
Sartre 1943, 115–116. Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1964, 246.
Sartre 1943, 114, 117, Sartre 1947, 67. On the pre-reflective level consciousness is characterized by the dyad reflet-reflétant, on the reflective level by the duality réflexif-réfléchif.
Sartre 1943, 116, 141, 144, 175–177, 182, 197, 245, Sartre 1948, 76. Despite his emphasis on time, and despite taking the dyadic structure of pre-reflective self-awareness to constitute the origin of temporality, Sartre nevertheless conceived of the structure itself as being atemporal.
Merleau-Ponty 1945, 427–428.
Merleau-Ponty 1945, 405. Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1945, 402.
Merleau-Ponty 1945, 400–401, 405, 511.
Hua 1, 128.
Derrida 1967a, 88, Bernet 1994, 173.
Merleau-Ponty 1945, 406, Merleau-Ponty 1960a, 213, 215, 221, Merleau-Ponty 1960b, 35, Merleau-Ponty 1964, 74, 278, Merleau-Ponty 1969, 186, 188.
G. Brand, Welt, Ich und Zeit (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), 74.
Cf. T. Seebohm, Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Tranzendental-Philosophie (Bouvier, 1962), 126–127);
J.G. Hart, “Constitution and reference in Husserl’s phenomenology of phenomenology,” Husserl Studies 6 (1989), 58;
K. Held, “Phänomenologie der Zeit nach Husserl” Perspektiven der Philosophie 1 (1981), 192.
Derrida 1967a, 89, 92.
Derrida 1967c, 235.
Derrida 1967a, 92, Derrida 1967c, 221, 237.
Cf. R. Barbaras, “Le sens de l’auto-affection chez Michel Henry et Merleau-Ponty,” Epokhè 2 (1991) 107.
Y. Yamagata, “Une autre lecture de L’essence de la manifestation: immanence, présent vivant et altérité” Études philosophiques 2 (1991), 179.
Hua XV, 349.
R. Sokolowski, “Ontological Possibilities in Phenomenology: The Dyad and the One,” Review of Metaphysics XXDC (1976), 699;
J.B. Brough, “The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-Consciousness,” Man and World 5 (1972), 326.
Sartre 1948, 63. 81.Derridal967a, 76.
It is interesting to note that Henry takes the distinction between the reflective and the pre-reflective cogito to be equivocal, and he himself does not use the term “pre-reflective” as a designation of the originary self-manifestation (Henry 1965, 76). Presumably, this is because the notion betrays a certain affiliation with the paradigm of reflection. To designate self-awareness as pre-reflective indicates that reflective self-awareness is still the yardstick.
Sartre 1943, 113, 194.
Ms. C 3 69a.
Hua XV, 543–544.
Held 1981, 192.
For a large-scale analysis of the structure of pre-reflective self-awareness see my Self-awareness andAlterity (forthcoming).
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Zahavi, D. (1998). The Fracture in Self-Awareness. In: Zahavi, D. (eds) Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9078-5_2
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