Abstract
Climate change (asymmetrically) affects all countries. Hence, the reduction of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (asymmetrically) benefits most, if not all, countries. However, each country individually bears the (sometimes relevant) cost of domestic policies designed to control greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. Moreover, most world countries have only a minor impact on total global emissions. These asymmetries, in benefits vs costs, in actions vs outcomes, are the source of the many difficulties in achieving an international agreement on climate change.
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Carraro, C. (1999). The structure of international environmental agreements. In: Carraro, C. (eds) International Environmental Agreements on Climate Change. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Feem) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9169-0_2
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