Skip to main content

Semantic Theory and Indirect Speech

  • Chapter
Concepts of Meaning

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 92))

Abstract

An overlooked assumption in much of the semantics literature is that there is a close connection between semantic content (whatever a semantic theory attempts to elucidate) and indirect speech. The assumption is that an adequate semantic theory T for a language L should assign p as the semantic content of an utterance u, by A, of a sentence S in L iff ┌A said that p┐ is true.1 We shall dub this assumption MA. In effect, since Galileo in uttering (I) makes (2) true, by MA, any adequate semantics for Italian must interpret (I) to mean that the earth moves.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Arnauld, R. (1976). “Sentence, Utterance, and Samesayer.” Nous 10,.283–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, T. (1982). “Prior and Davidson on Indirect Speech” Philosophical Studies 42, 255–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1986). “On Davidson’s “Saying that”.” Truth and Interpretation. Edited by E. Lep-ore. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 190–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cappelen, H., and E. Lepore (1997). “Varieties of Quotation.” Mind.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cappelen, H., and E. Lepore (1997). “On an Alleged Connection between Indirect Speech and the Theory of Meaning.” Mind and Language. Forthcoming.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1984). (IT) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1976). “Reply to Foster.” Rep. IT, 171–180.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1975). “Thought and Talk” Rep. IT, 155–170.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1968). “On Saying That.” Rep. IT, 93–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1967). “Truth and Meaning” Reprinted in IT, 1967, 17–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G., and J. McDowell, eds. (1976). Truth and Meaning. Oxford: OUP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J., and E. Lepore (1972). Holism: A Shopper’s Guide. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foster, J. (1976). “Meaning and Truth Theory.” Evans and McDowell, 1–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haack, R. J. (1971). “On Davidson’s Paratactic Theory of Oblique Contexts” Nous 5, 351–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hand, M. (1991). “On Saying That Again.” Linguistics and Philosophy 14, 349–365.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D. (1989). “Demonstratives.”Themes from Kaplan. Edited by J. Almog, et al.

    Google Scholar 

  • Larson, R., and P. Ludlow (1993). “Interpreted Logical Forms” Synthese 95, 305–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Larson, R., and G. Segal (1995). Knowledge and Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lepore, E., and B. Loewer (1989). “You can say that again.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Edited by H. Wettstein, et al., 338–356.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. (1976). “Two Theories of Meaning.” Evans, and McDowell, 138–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1987). “In Defence of Modesty.” Michael Dummett. Edited by B. M.Taylor. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987, 59–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1976). “Truth Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism.” Evans. and McDowell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Platts, M. (1979). Ways of Meaning, RKP, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rumfitt, I. (1993). “Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised.” Mind 102, 429–453.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schiffer, S. (1987). Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segal, G. (1989). “A Preference for Sense and Reference” Journal of Philosophy 86, 73–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Seymour, M. (1994). “Indirect Discourse and Quotation”, Philosophical Studies 74, 1–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Soames, S. (1989), “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content” Philo-sophical Topics 15, 47–87.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Cappelen, H., Lepore, E. (2003). Semantic Theory and Indirect Speech. In: Preyer, G., Peter, G., Ulkan, M. (eds) Concepts of Meaning. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 92. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0197-6_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0197-6_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6300-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0197-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics