Dynamic Representations Guiding Adaptive Behavior

Abstract

We plan and execute our own actions while other animals, people, vehicles, and objects move around us. Our survival depends on the success of these daily interactions with a dynamic environment. It is thus highly advantageous to anticipate the movement of other creatures and objects in relation to our own future states. Even if we are planning to walk around or lift up an object currently at rest, we need to anticipate the effect of our motor movements on the environment. The advantages to anticipating movement suggest that representations of the world emphasize the future. I will review empirical support for my theory of “dynamic mental representations” with a focus on the implicit perceptual knowledge we have of dynamics and biomechanical motion. I will suggest that time represents time, and that therefore the normal view that representations are in some way distinct from processes is incorrect. Instead, I will argue, mental representations are an emergent property of processes unfolding over time. In this view, “representation” refers to the correspondence between internal and external information. Temporal information about the immediate future is of primary significance to our motor success, and thus to the human mind.