Abstract
Many politicians, in an election, join political parties and create political advertisements. Political advertisements take many forms including TV commercial, Web sites, and posters, which are often criticized for wasting money. This study sheds lights on their positive aspect: they function as signals to voters under asymmetric information. In the election, candidates’ policy preferences (e.g., preferences for income redistribution) are uncertain for voters. Candidates use political parties and advertisements to signal their hidden preference to the voters. Investigating a multi-period version of Snyder and Ting (2002) with the possibility of reelection, I show that political parties are not sufficient signals to reveal politicians’ types. Political advertisements work as a complementary signal to political parties. With political parties and advertisements, voters can elect their favorable candidates adequately. Even if the advertisements are a waste of money, they contribute to voting for favored candidates.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This is the equilibrium when \(\theta < \sqrt{3} /2\) in Snyder and Ting (2002).
- 2.
For simplicity, I omit the loser from the following list.
- 3.
To be precise, the belief is as follows: (i) no party joining and \(ad < w-c\): then, the candidate is \(z_j\) or loser; (ii) no party joining and \(ad \ge w-c\): then the candidate is \(z_i\); (iii) party joining and \(ad < w-c -\alpha z_j ^2\): then, the candidate is \(z_j\); and (iv) party joining and \(ad \ge w-c -\alpha z_j ^2\): then, the candidate is \(z_i\).
- 4.
To be precise, the belief is as follows: (i) no party joining and \(ad < w-c\): then, the candidate is \(z_j\) or loser; (ii) no party joining and \(ad \ge w-c\): then, the candidate is \(z_i\): (iii) party joining and \(ad < w-c -\alpha z_j ^2\): then, the candidate is \(z_j\); and (iv) party joining and \(ad \ge w-c -\alpha z_j ^2\): then, the candidate is \(z_i\).
- 5.
To be precise, the belief is as follows: (i) no party joining and \(ad < 2(w-c)\): then, the candidate is \(z_j\) or loser; (ii) no party joining and \(ad \ge 2(w-c)\): then, the candidate is \(z_i\); (iii) party joining and \(ad < 2(w-c) -\alpha z_j ^2\); then, the candidate is \(z_j\); and (iv) party joining and \(ad \ge 2(w-c) -\alpha z_j ^2\): then, the candidate is \(z_i\).
References
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986). Price and advertising signals of product quality. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 796–821.
Snyder, J. M, Jr., & Ting, M. M. (2002). An informational rationale for political parties. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 90–110.
Tamura, M. (2018) A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements. Theoretical Economics Letters, 8(3), 241–255.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Development Bank of Japan
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tamura, M. (2018). A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements. In: Economic Signals. SpringerBriefs in Economics(). Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8938-1_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8938-1_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-10-8937-4
Online ISBN: 978-981-10-8938-1
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)