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Making Sense of Europe’s Response to the Gulf Crisis

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Divided Gulf

Part of the book series: Contemporary Gulf Studies ((CGS))

Abstract

The last chapter continues to look at how Qatar’s soft power might have shaped the response by its European partners to the Gulf divide. Kettner examines how Germany, France and the UK have responded to the internal Gulf rift and explains how these different responses came about. This chapter looks at both economic and security interests, as well as ideologies, values and personal interests in determining how the leading countries in Europe dealt with both Qatar and the main protagonists of the blockade, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The chapter indicates how the three Gulf states have been able to translate their soft power into political influence within the three different domestic contexts of Berlin, Paris and London. The extremely supportive approach toward Qatar taken by Germany can thereby be explained by a unique set of circumstances Kettner demonstrates.

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Notes

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Correspondence to Jeremias Kettner .

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Kettner, J. (2019). Making Sense of Europe’s Response to the Gulf Crisis. In: Krieg, A. (eds) Divided Gulf. Contemporary Gulf Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6314-6_15

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