Abstract
Here, the dynamics behind the decision to occupy are examined more closely, with China’s strategic motivations and the timeline of events first presented. It postulates why the Chinese acted when they did, and why Mischief Reef was selected. The murky question of who among the Chinese elite sanctioned the risky operation is tackled, describing the key actors and agencies behind the move as well as the likely factors that led to the takeover. The chapter shows how China increasingly felt that rival claimants, especially Vietnam, were irreversibly undermining its relative claims in the area, and that action was urgently needed. It also discusses how China’s presence might have helped prevent an entente between the Philippines and Vietnam. At the very least, it ensured the Philippines did not occupy the reef first. An examination of the influence of PRC domestic politics and political circumstances of the time are undertaken, including competing interests which impacted on the country’s Spratly Islands’ policies. The influence of uncertain post-Tiananmen post-Cold War circumstances in China is also brought up. The chapter shows how stresses between the civilian leadership, the moderate Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hardliners within the military influenced approaches to the Spratly disputes.
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Notes
- 1.
“Tropical Cyclones in 1994”, Royal Observatory of Hong Kong, 12–14.
- 2.
Valencia et al., Sharing the Resources, 79.
- 3.
Klare, Resource Wars, 125.
- 4.
Fravel, Strong Borders, 296–299.
- 5.
Dzurek, “China Occupies Mischief Reef,” 68.
- 6.
Ibid.
- 7.
Chung, “The Spratley Islands Dispute,” 280–281.
- 8.
Valencia et al., “Sharing the Resources,” 80.
- 9.
Fravel, Strong Borders, 313.
- 10.
“China Nibbles, ASEAN Dithers.” 1995.
- 11.
“Hye Mieko Attack Triggers,” 1995.
- 12.
Storey, 100. See also Guan, 11; Chung, 269.
- 13.
Dzurek, “China Occupies Mischief Reef,” 67.
- 14.
Raman, “Chinese Territorial Assertions”.
- 15.
Fravel, Strong Borders, 296–299.
- 16.
Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” 4–5, 19.
- 17.
Ibid., 2.
- 18.
Bush, “China-Japan Tensions,” 30.
- 19.
Lo, Ping, “Jiang Zemin Seen,” 138.
- 20.
“Party Leaders, Generals,” Hong Kong Standard, 1.
- 21.
Ming Pao, Hong Kong.
- 22.
Ibid.
- 23.
Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy, 11.
- 24.
Guan, “The South China Sea,” 11.
- 25.
Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness,” 101.
- 26.
Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 239–240.
- 27.
Ibid., 240.
- 28.
Chung, “The Spratly Islands Dispute,” 265.
- 29.
Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness,” 101.
- 30.
Chung, 273, 290–291, 300–301.
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Fox, S. (2021). The Decision to Occupy. In: Mischief Reef. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3884-8_4
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