Abstract
This chapter briefly addresses the historical intra-Muslim debates over the concept of caliphate (“Islamic” governance), demonstrating how crucial Islamic concepts such as the caliphate cannot be understood meaningfully without situating them in relation to specific times and places. The author argues that the establishment of the caliphate was not informed by any “universalist dogma,” but by pressing communal issues such as tribal and communal rivalries. The caliphate—both as a concept and as an institution—underwent various historical metamorphoses. By showing how caliphate politics was closely linked to the rise of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the author challenges the common assumption—in the scholarship on Ottoman history—that Islam was a hindrance to ethnic self-consciousness.
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Notes
- 1.
John Alden Williams, The Word of Islam, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 202.
- 2.
Despite their contradictory contents, there are various Sunni hadiths (the sayings attributed to the Prophet), some of which ambiguously, and others with clarity, hold forth on some aspects of the immediate era after the Prophet’s death. Some of these hadiths state that it is incumbent on all Muslims to follow his tradition and that of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, (ʿalaykum bisunnati wa sunnati khulafāʾ al-rāshidīn al- mahdiyīn). These hadiths are delineated during this period of the “true caliphate” according to which the caliphate will last only for thirty years after the Prophet’s death. Thereafter, based on the hadiths, the caliphate will transform into an oppressive kingdom (mulkan ʿa d u d). See, Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani, Al-Sayl al-Jarrar al-Mutadaffiq ‘alá Hada’iqi al-Azhar/the Torrential Flood over the Garden of Flowers, vol. 4 (Cairo: Lujnah Ihyaʾ al-turath al-Islami, 2000), 472–73. However, as indicated above, the way these events unfolded evidences that the first generation of Muslims was completely unaware of such prophesy about the future. Thus, to claim, as Oliver-Dee does, that “the qualifications and remit of the caliph appear to have been defined with reasonable clarity in the Hadith [and] it is from the Traditions that we can glean that the candidate must be of the Quraishi tribe” shows a lack enough familiarity with the contradictory nature of Hadiths. See, Sean Oliver-Dee, The Caliphate Question: The British government and Islamic governance (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 33. The above statement also indicates unfamiliarity with some major historical events after the Prophet’s death such as the dispute between Ansar and Muhajiroon over choosing the successors of the Prophet of Islam.One interesting question is what the debate over caliphate would have looked like if, for instance, the first caliph was a non-Quraishi or he was from Medina? How much lineage or belonging to a certain tribe or place could become a criterion for the caliphal qualification? It should be noted that some of the most permanent companions of the Prophet, from Medina such as Saʿd Ibn ʿUbbadah, did recognize Abu Bakr’s leadership position. Ibn ʿUbbadah never accepted Abu Bakr’s Imamate and refused to pray behind him. He also refused Abu Bakr’s proposal to choose leaders (ʾumarāʾ) from among Meccans and their deputies (wuzarā’) from among Medinans when Abu Bakr proposed ʾumarā’un minna wa wuzarāʾun minkum. (At-Tabbari Vol. 3, 197–211 quoted in: Ali ʿAbd al-Raziq, al-Islām wa al-ʾUṡūl al-Ḥukm/Islam and the Principles of Authority (Cairo: Maktaba Ufuq al-Thaqafi, 1925), www.ofouq.com (4/12/13).
- 3.
W.M. Watt, “God’s Caliph: Qurʾanic Interpretation and the Umayyad Caliphs,” in Vladimir Minorsky and Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Iran and Islam: In Memory of the Late Vladimir Minorsky (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), 568. It must be noted that during their rules, the first four caliphs were addressed as amir al-muʾminīn, the commander of the faithful. The Zaidies have usually used the term amir as opposed to caliph. The Twelver Shiʿi have continued to use this title for Ali, the fourth caliph. He was the only Shiʿi imām to be regarded as such. Also, he was the only Shiʿi imām who actually had a chance to rule. However, in a way, the constant reassertion of ʿAli’s leadership seems to indicate a continuous protest of the other three caliphs by the Twelvers. Also, the term Khalīfatu Rasūil Allāh was generally used in retrospect with a similar purpose to protest the Umayyad’s claim to caliphate of which Khalīfatul Allāh is a shortened version. After killing one of the Prophet’s grandsons, Hussein, and abrogating their contract with another, Hassan, the Umayyads could not easily establish their lineage with al-Rasul (the messenger). However, Abbasids, who destroyed the Umayyad rule, were particularly keen to emphasize their Qureshi-ness and their lineage with Muhammad. Most likely, the claim that the hadith states “the caliphate will only last for thirty years” was also fabricated by the Umayyads’ opponents. (It seems this hadith’s condemnatory tone with respect to post-Rashidun had inspired Maududy to use as the title of his book, The Caliphate and the Kingship.)
- 4.
Yadullah Sahabi, Khelqat-e Insan/the Creation of Man (Tehran: Shirkat-i Sahami-yi Intishar, 1972). The aim here is not to reproduce the related theological debate by the Muslim commentators, which is vast and disparate. The attempt here is to show that Khilafa is not mentioned in the Qurʾān in its political sense or as an institution. The Qurʾān 14 times uses variations of the root word of this term; sometimes in singular and other times in its plural form. Also, the Qur’an employs noun, verb, or adjective forms of the term caliphate. However, it usually connotes the replacement or succession of a person, a group, or a society by another. For instance, The Qur’an 2/30: “I am about to establish upon earth one who shall inherit (Khal ī fa) it. 7/69): “ Do but remember how He made you [plural] heirs [Khalāʾif] to Noah’s people” 7/129 “(Moses) replied: ‘it may well be that your [plural] sustainer will destroy your [plural] foe and make you [plural] inherit [yasta khlaf akum] the earth: thereupon he will behold how you act.” 27/62: “has made you [plural] inherit [khulafāʾ] the earth” Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur ʾ an (Gibraltar London, Dar al-Andalus, Brill, 1980). Compare the above verses with what attributed to ‘Umar with respect to him becoming a caliph and replacing Abu Bakr: In Ista khlāf u faqad ista khlāf a man huwa khairu minni, wa in atrukhum faqad tarakahum man huwa khairu minni. Should I choose my successor, I would be following the tradition of a person who was better than myself, that is, Abu Bakr and again, if I leave you without choosing someone to succeed me, I would be following another person better I was: Muhammad. See, Abd al-Malik Ibn Hisham and Muhammad Ibn Is.haq, Sirat an-Nabi, trans. Rafi’ al-Din Ishaq bn-e Muhammad Hamadani, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Tehran: Kharazmi, 1981), 1109. Of course, this again contradicts the commonly accepted Sunni view about the issue of succession.
- 5.
Sirat an-Nabi, 2: 1113–15.
- 6.
Ibid., 1125–26.
- 7.
Here, the attempt is to briefly attend to some aspects of the debate surrounding caliphate among Sunnis. For a comprehensive sociological study of the issue of authority in Islam, see Hamid Dabashi, Authority in Islam: From the Rise of Muhammad to the Establishment of the Umayyads (New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 1989).
- 8.
Cf. Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashīd Riḍā’s Ideas on the Caliphate.”
- 9.
Shawkani, Al-Sayl al-Jarrar al-Mutadaffiq ‘alá Hada’iqi al-Azhar, 4: 476. Muhammad Shibli Numani, Omar the Great, the Second Caliph of Islam, 1 (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf, 1961), 18. Ibn Hisham and Ibn Is.haq, Sirat an-Nabi, 2: 1118–22.
- 10.
Shibli Numani, Omar the Great, the Second Caliph of Islam, vol. 1, 91.
- 11.
Amin, Duha Al-Islam/the Sunrise of Islam, vol.1, 39.
- 12.
Cf. Abu al-ʿAlà Maududi, Khilafat va Molukiyyat/the Caliphate and Kingship (Paveh Entesharât-e Bayan, 1985), 115–84; ibid. Also, the second part of Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, Rev. ed. (Oneonta, N.Y.: Islamic Publications International, 2000).
- 13.
Maududy, Khalafat va Molukiyyat, 174–75. Ali’s categorical refusal to follow the tradition of his predecessors was the major reason for the selection committee to disqualify him to succeed ‘Umar.
- 14.
Amin, Duha al-Islam, vol.1, 38–96.
- 15.
al-Kardari quoted in: Maududy, Khalafat va Molukiyyat/Caliphate and Kingship, 305.
- 16.
Ibid., 351–52.
- 17.
Amin, Duha Al-Islam, vol. 1, 79. Also, Abu al-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAli al-Masʿudi, Muruj Al-Dhahab Wa-Maadin Al-Jawhar, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Cairo:1303), 191.
- 18.
Amin, Duha Al-Islam, vol.1, 93–100.
- 19.
Quoted in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939. Issued under the Auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 10.
- 20.
Muhammad al-Ghazali, The Socio-Political Thought of Shah Wali Allah (Islamic Research Institute, 2001), 84.
- 21.
Tāj al-Dīn Abū al-Fath Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastani, al-Milal wa al-Nihal, vol. 1 (Cairo:1946), 51.
- 22.
Mawālī is a plural for mawlà, a freed slave. The Umayyad rulers generally considered non-Arabs mawālī.
- 23.
For an interesting and extensive discussion on Shuʿubiyye, see Ahmad Amin, Duha Al-Islam/the Sunrise of Islam, 1.
- 24.
Amin, Duha al-Islam, vol.1, 67–70.
- 25.
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939. Issued under the Auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 6.
- 26.
Ibid.
- 27.
Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State, 243.
- 28.
See, Hamilton A.R. Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” [Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate.] Orient, Vol. 15 (Dec. 31, 1962), pp. 287–295. Since I could not obtain the original booklet by Luṭfī Paşa, I had to really on Gibb’s translation of it.
- 29.
It is interesting to note that Saudi press and media always refer to Saudi Kings as the servants of the holy shrines.
In 1987, after the Iranian regime challenged their authority during the ritual of Haj, such a reference to these kings became a tradition.
- 30.
al-Aqqad, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi 69. Also, M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918–1924, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999), 13.
- 31.
In his discussion on the local resistance to the Ottoman rule, Makdisi recounts that “the first century of Ottoman rule in Mount Lebanon was turbulent, and it witnessed frequent local rebellions and equally frequent Ottoman expeditions to subdue the local inhabitants”. See, Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 775.
- 32.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate.”
- 33.
Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian politics: a study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918–1924: 13.
- 34.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” 288–89.
- 35.
Cf. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Zındıler Ve Mülhidler/Heretics and Infidels (Istanbul: Tarih Vekfi Yurt Yayinleri, 2003).
- 36.
In the twentieth century, Al-Taftazani’s views, once again, were criticized by Rashid Rida, a staunch defender of Arab caliphate. See; Muhammad Rashid Rida, Al-Khilāfa aw al-Imāma al-ʿUẓmà/the Caliphate or the Great Imamate (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Manar bi-Misr, 1934).
- 37.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” 292. (Later in nineteenth and twentieth centuries, British Colonial officials made similar augments in their defense of a possible Arab caliphate. Cf. Azmi Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877–1924, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, (New York: Brill, 1997).
- 38.
Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, by far the most renowned and influential 18th century Muslim scholar in the Indian subcontinent, once more cited Quraishiness as a necessary qualification for the caliph. In addition to Quraishiness, he argued that the caliph must be the most prominent scholar and mujtahid of his time (see Muhammad al-Ghazzali, 2001). Yet, his grandson, Shah Muhammad Ishaq (1778–1846), exhibited a starkly different approach to the issue of Khilafa. He “was probably the first Indian ‘alim who supported the Ottoman policies from around 1841 when he migrated to Mecca” (Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 16). There are some similarities between Muhammad al-Shawkani (1759–1834) views and of Shah Waliullah with regard to the qualifications of the caliph. Yet, Al-Shawkani believed that there was no difference between caliphate and Imamate institutions. However, both discontinued with in post Rashidun era (al- Shawkani, Al-Sayl al-jarrar al-mutadaffiq ʿalà Hadaʾiq al-Azhar/ The Torrential Flood Over the Garden of Flowers, v.4, 472–83).
- 39.
al-Aqqad, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.
- 40.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” 288–90.
- 41.
Ibid., 290.
- 42.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate.”
- 43.
The Quran, 42/38: “O Prophet! Whenever believing women come unto thee to pledge their allegiance to thee …and would not disobey thee in anything right [ma‘ruf ]- then accept their pledge of allegiance” what needs to kept in mind is how these concepts could change over time. The text indicates that women could have ascertained what is wrong and they were obliged to obey only what they believe was right.
- 44.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” 293.
- 45.
This question in particular carries traces of Shi‘i belief since the ruler must be just and infallible according to earlier Shi‘ism.
- 46.
In the original.
- 47.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” 294.
- 48.
In the original.
- 49.
Gibb, “Luṭfī Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate,” 290.
- 50.
For a detailed historical account on different religious groups’ resistance to the Ottoman rule, in the sixteenth century, see, Ocak, Zındıler ve Mülhidler/Heretics and Infidels. Also, Fleischer, Bureaucrat and intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the historian Mustafa Ali (1541–1600).
- 51.
Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 8.
- 52.
Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East, (Boston: Brill, 2004), 490–91.
- 53.
The letter of Midhat Pasha, the main author of the 1876 Ottoman constitution, to Abdulhamid II, is very revealing. Midhat Pasha writes:
Your majesty my king! The goal for drafting [the constitution] and for the declaration of the principals of Constitutionalism was: To end autocracy (istibdad), to inform (iḳaẓ) you about your responsibilities…I, as your majesty’s humble servant, am extremely loyal to you. Nonetheless, I shall declare and excuse myself from your obedience in anything that may even slightly harm or contradict the interests of the nation.
See, İstikbal/The Independent, (No: 25; 12/22/1880).
- 54.
Ibid.
- 55.
See, “1876 Constitution,” in Salname-i Devlet (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ahmet İhsan ve Şurekası, 1322/1904).
- 56.
For a detailed study of the Ottoman Constitution, see Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).
- 57.
Cf. Nader Sohrabi, Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, 1902–1910 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 58.
Nursi, İçtima-I Dersler, 115.
- 59.
Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, 1st ed., Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005), xviii.
- 60.
Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation (Basingstoke England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 148.
- 61.
Ibid., 149.
- 62.
Cf. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey.
- 63.
Cf. Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries, Suny Series in Middle Eastern Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 124. The head of this “faction” was no one other than Seyyid Abdulqadir. In the late nineteenth century, Seyyid Abdulqadir joined the CUP just a few years after its creation. Interestingly, Özoğlu sees no contradiction between the above statement and his earlier remarks when he states: “It is interesting to encounter his name in the CUP, then an underground organization that worked against the sultan/caliph Abdulhamid II, because Abdulkadir himself was a part of the Ottoman religious establishment” (90). These assertions become even more interesting when they are contrasted with the state records. The state documents reveal Abdulqadir had no qualms about killing Ottoman soldiers; in 1882, “Sheikh Abdulqadir, the son of Sheikh Ubeydullah, in his attack on the royal army martyred 10 and injured 12 Soldiers. He also captured 30 soldiers including their commanding officers.”
See, BOA: Dosya No: 3, Gömlek No: 4, Fon Kodu: Y. PRK.A; Tarih: 23/M /1300 (Hicrî)/[4.12.1882]
- 64.
Emphasis added.
- 65.
Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation, 45.
- 66.
See the preceding chapter.
- 67.
Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey, 148.
- 68.
Cf. Mujtaba Borzuei, Avżâ°-E Kordestan az 1258–1325/the Situation in Kurdistan from 1879 to 1946 (Tehran Nashr-e Nou, 1999). Also, Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation.
- 69.
For one the most profound discussions on caliphate by Seyyid Bey, the Turkish Justice Minister in 1924, see, TBMM zabıtları (Turkish Grand National Assembly’s minutes):, [VII, 1 Mart 1340 (1924)] Pp. 55–65, http://www.tufs.ac.jp/common/fs/asw/tur/htu/data/HTU2136%28ZC%29-35/index.djvu.
- 70.
See, ibid.
- 71.
Quoted in Taha Akyol, Atatürk’ün İhtilal Hukuku/the Revolutionary Justic System of Atatürk (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012), 387.
- 72.
Even renowned secular figures journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was regarded a reactionary who opposed Kemalist policies with respect to the abolition. Yalçın deemed the abolishment of the caliphate harmful to the geopolitical interest of Turkey. Cf. Ibid., 327.
- 73.
John Parker and Charles Smith, Modern Turkey (London: G. Routledge & sons, 1940), 12.
- 74.
Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation, 148.
- 75.
Cf. Hakan Özog˘lu, “Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?” in Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey ed. Ayse Kadioglu and Emin Fuat Keyman (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011).
- 76.
For the complete text, see TBMM zabıtları (Turkish Grand National Assembly’s minutes): [VII, 1 Mart 1340 (1924)] p. 44–70. http://www.tufs.ac.jp/common/fs/asw/tur/htu/data/HTU2136%28ZC%29-35/index.djvu.
- 77.
Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation, 51.
- 78.
- 79.
Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.”
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Soleimani, K. (2016). The Politics of the Khilafa, Old and New. In: Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926. The Modern Muslim World. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59940-7_3
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