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Vagueness and Practical Interest

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Vagueness and Language Use

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition ((PSPLC))

Abstract

Take the vague expression “tall.” Two outstanding phenomena of its vagueness seem to be:

Sorites Susceptibility. One is inclined to accept the soritical principle: (S0) For every x and y, if x is tall and y is 1 inch shorter than x, then y is tall,

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© 2011 Paula Sweeney and Elia Zardini

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Sweeney, P., Zardini, E. (2011). Vagueness and Practical Interest. In: Égré, P., Klinedinst, N. (eds) Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230299313_12

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