Abstract
Most international environmental problems require widespread cooperation if they are to be addressed successfully. Emissions of substances that harm the ozone layer, create acid rain, or contribute to global climate change come from a large number of states. Even if one or several try to limit their output of these substances, the broader problem will not be solved unless most states that emit these substances do so as well. Similarly, the protection of international or transboundary resources, like fisheries or endangered species, requires that all major consumers of these resources limit their consumption; otherwise, the action by one or more who have not agreed to do so can undermine the ability to protect the resource.
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DeSombre, E.R. (2001). Encouraging Participation in International Environmental Agreements. In: Jeong, HW. (eds) Global Environmental Policies. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503359_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503359_7
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