Abstract
Such an assertion is neither novel nor one-sided. The rapid speed of China’s acquisition of many advanced weapons systems and its improvements in training and doctrine have rendered Taiwan’s relative qualitative advantage in weapons and personnel to be no longer sustainable. In the past, this was regarded as Taiwan’s critical advantage for counterbalancing China’s quantitative superiority. Many analysts, both in Taiwan and the United States, believe it is only a matter of time before China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) outpaces their Taiwan’s counterparts in quality as well. Besides, the US Department of Defense (DoD) repeatedly expressed its concerns over this emerging imbalance; many American scholars have reached the similar conclusion. For example, Dr. David Shambaugh claimed in 2002 that the PLA would complete its preparations to present a credible threat to Taiwan by 2007.1 In Taiwan, several key national security policymakers also gradually realized this embarrassing fact. Former Chairperson Tsai Ing-Wen of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council even argued that Taiwan might lose its military superiority in 2005.2 According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), the PLA’s air and naval capabilities might “qualitatively surpass that of ours by 2010.”3
The cross-Strait military balance is shifting in the mainland’s favor as a result of Beijing’s sustained economic growth, increased diplomatic leverage, and improvements in military capabilities based within striking range of Taiwan. (US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China, Washington, 2006)
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Notes
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 329.
Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Westport: Praeger, 1994), pp. 1–4.
Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 16.
Ajay Singh, “Time: The New Dimension in War,” Joint Forces Quarterly, vol. 10 (1995), p. 129.
Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation, Dominance, and US-China Relations,” International Security, vol. 27, no. 2 (2002), p. 82.
Hau Pei-Tsun, Eight-Year Diary as the Chief of General Staff, vol. 1 (Taiwan: Commonwealth Publishing Company, 2000), p. 153. Original in Chinese.
ROC MND, The Dictionary of Military Terms of the ROC Armed Forces, 1999, pp. 2–14. Original in Chinese.
For example, Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–1955 and 1958,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 143–167.
Niu Jun, “Chinese Decision Making in Three Military Actions Across the Taiwan Strait,” in Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. Michael D. Swaine, Zhang Tuosheng, and Danielle F. S. Cohen (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 313.
According to Professor Cole’s assessment, the transit time for the US reinforcing vessels to arrive in the Taiwan Strait from Hawaii or the US west coast will take 9–14 days or 12–18 days respectively. See Bernard D. Cole, “The Modernizing People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) and Taiwan’s Security,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2 (2001), p. 121.
Michael Pillsbury, “The US Role in Taiwan’s Defense Reforms,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, vol. 4, no. 2 (2003), p. 70.
Michael S. Chase, “US-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship,” in Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis ed. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 174–179.
For details, see Paul H. B. Godwin, “The PLA Faces the Twenty-First Century: Reflections on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations,” in China’s Military Faces the Future, ed. James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 48–53.
Council on Foreign Relations, Chinese Military Power, 2003, p. 3.
Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), National Defense Report, 2006, p. 60. Original in Chinese.
“‘Aircraft-Sea Air Combat’ at Taiwan Strait,” Kanwa Defense Review, May 2006, pp. 18–19. Original in Chinese (also in English and Japanese). Also, US DoD, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China, 2006, p. 29.
Bernard D. Cole, “The Modernizing People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) and Taiwan’s Security,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2 (2001), p. 118.
For details, see Martin Edmonds and York W. Chen, “Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization: Views from Strategic and Operational Considerations,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2 (2002), pp. 144–172.
ROCAF Lt. Col. (retired) Haiso-Lung Chen, “Analysis on the Employment of the PLA’s Tactical Missiles against Taiwan,” National Defense Magazine, vol. 18, no. 1 (1998), p. 106. Original in Chinese.
Jonathan D. Pollack, “Short-Range Ballistic Missile Capabilities,” in If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics, and Economics, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 58.
US DoD, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of People’s Republic of China, 2006, p. 29.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Report to Congress, 2006, p. 145.
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© 2008 Peter C. Y. Chow
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Chen, Y.W. (2008). A New Imbalance in the Equation of Military Balance Across the Taiwan Strait. In: Chow, P.C.Y. (eds) The “One China” Dilemma. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230611931_14
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