Skip to main content

Integrating Theoretical and Empirical Models of Party Switching

  • Chapter
Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching

Abstract

Party switching is a relatively common yet little studied phenomenon. Observers have remarked on the presence of switching in various circumstances and settings, but with a very few exceptions (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2005; 2008; Laver and Benoit 2003) scholars have not seen party switching as theoretically interesting. They have instead treated party switching as an idiosyncratic phenomenon, entirely dependent on context, and essentially sui generis in each occurrence. The contributions to this volume represent an attempt to address what we see as a gap between extant empirical accounts of switching and the substantial leverage that a theoretically driven approach to switching can provide. Taken together, the chapters examine the contexts, causes, and consequences of party switching. Although most of the chapters focus on one or a few country cases, and each chapter examines only a piece of a larger set of strategic interactions in which switching occurs, each does so in explicitly theoretical terms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

2.6 References

  • Àgh, Attila. 1999. “The Parliamentarization of the East Central European Parties: Party Discipline in the Hungarian Parliament, 1990–1996.” In Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, ed. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, 167–188. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Aldrich, John H., and William T. Bianco. 1992. “A Game-Theoretic Model of Party Affiliation of Candidates and Office Holders.” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 16 (8/9): 103–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, Christopher. 1995. Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. “The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll Call Voting.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26 (4): 533–572.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell, and Richard Katz. 1999. “Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments.” In Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, ed. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, 3–22. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, Andrea C., Gary W. Cox, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2001. “Agenda Power in the U.S. Senate, 1877 to 1986.” In Party, Process, and Political Change: New Perspectives on the History of Congress, ed. David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, 146–165. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, Gary W. 1987. The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mathew D. McCubbins. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, Gary W. 1994. “Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (2): 215–231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1997. “Political Structure and Economic Policy: The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes.” In Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy: When Do Institutions Matter? ed. Stephen Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins. San Diego: University of California.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2001. “Agenda Power in the House of Representatives.” In Party, Process, and Political Change: New Perspectives on the History of Congress, ed. David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, 107–145. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Desposato, Scott W. 2006. “Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 62–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Onofrio, Francesco. 1979. “Committees in the Italian Parliament.” In Committees in Legislatures, ed. John David Lees and Malcolm T. Shaw, 61–101. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Filippov, Mikhail, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova. 2004. Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, Michael, and Michael Marsh, eds. 1988. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics. London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greif, Avner. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Heller, William B. 2001. “Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences in Bicameral Parliamentary Systems.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17 (1): 34–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heller, William B. 2007. “Divided Politics: Bicameralism, Parties, and Policy in Democratic Legislatures.” Annual Review of Political Science 10: 245–269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heller, William B., and Carol Mershon. 2005. “Party Switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996–2001.” Journal of Politics 67 (2): 536–559.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heller, William B., and Carol Mershon. 2008. “Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 910–925.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heller, William B., Philip Keefer, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. “Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Cases from the Developing World.” In The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World, ed. Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins, 146–178. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hey, John D., and Chris J. McKenna. 1979. “To Move or Not to Move?” Economica 46 (182): 175–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. “Where’s the Party?” British Journal of Political Science 23: 235–266.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1999. “How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments.” In Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, ed. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, 23–48. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Benoit. 2003. “The Evolution of Party Systems between Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (2, April): 215–233.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1990. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luebbert, Gregory. 1986. Comparative Democracy: Policy-Making and Government Coalitions in Europe and Israel. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. “The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress.” American Political Science Review 95 (3): 673–687.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDonald, Michael D. 2004. “Parties in Democracy, Democracy in Parties: Lessons I Learned from Ian Budge and the CMP Data.” Binghamton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mershon, Carol, and Olga Shvetsova. 2008. “Parliamentary Cycles and Party Switching in Legislatures.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (1): 99–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mershon, Carol, and William B. Heller. 2003. “Party Switching and Political Careers in the Spanish Congress of Deputies, 1982–1996.” Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 3–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miskin, Sarah. 2003. “Politician Overboard: Jumping the Party Ship.” Unpublished paper. Parliament of Australia: Parliamentary Library—Politics and Public Administration Group.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moser, Robert G. 2001. Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm, eds. 1999. Policy, Office, or Votes: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nokken, Timothy P. 2000. “Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll Call Behavior, 1947–1997.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (3): 414–444.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Edited by J. E. Alt and D. C. North. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Rasch, Bjørn Erik. 1999. “Electoral Systems, Parliamentary Committees, and Party Discipline: The Norwegian Storting in a Comparative Perspective.” In Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, ed. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, 121–140. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” American Political Science Review 76 (4): 753–766.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sánchez de Dios, Manuel. 1999. “Parliamentary Party Discipline in Spain.” In Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, ed. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, 141–162. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1972. “The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition.” American Political Science Review 66 (2): 555–568.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, James M., Jr., and Michael M. Ting. 2002. “An Informational Rationale for Political Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (1): 90–110.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, Kaare. 1990. “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (2, May): 565–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, Kaare. 1994. “The Presthus Debacle: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway.” American Political Science Review 88 (1): 112–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, Kaare. 2000. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (3): 261–289.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomás Mallén, Beatriz. 2002. Transfuguismo parlamentario y democracia de partidos. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turan, Ilter. 1985. “Changing Horses in Midstream: Party Changers in the Turkish National Assembly.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 10 (1): 21–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

William B. Heller Carol Mershon

Copyright information

© 2009 William B. Heller and Carol Mershon

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Heller, W.B., Mershon, C. (2009). Integrating Theoretical and Empirical Models of Party Switching. In: Heller, W.B., Mershon, C. (eds) Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230622555_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics