Abstract
Under the gradualist transition process in Asian post-planned economies, the state sector still retains its control over economic activity. It may be the case that this helped to prevent a collapse of institutions which has facilitated a secure economic transition to date. However, whether this state-owned market economy will be sustainable in the future is another question. These economies, particularly in China which has the longest history of transition and has not yet completed its reforms, are encountering another problem: when and how will the state withdraw from economic life? So far, whether the state should exit or not has not been seriously addressed in the context of evaluating the gradual/shock transition process. It is this question that we will consider here.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bebchuk, L. A. (1999) “A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control” Working Paper 7203. NBER.
Bebchuk, L.A. et al. (2000) “Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash- Flow Right,” in R.K. Morck (ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Classens, S., S. Djankov and L. Lang (2000) “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81–112.
Faccio, M., L.P.H. Lang and L. Young (2001) “Dividends and Expropriation,” American Economic Review 91(1), 54–78.
Hart, O. (2001) “Financial Contracting,” Journal of Economic Literature 39(4), 1079–1100.
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976) “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305–60.
Lau, Lawrence, Yingyi Qian and Gerald Roland (2000) “Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual Track Approach to Transition,” Journal of Political Economy 108(1), 120–43.
McMillan J. and B. Naughton (1992) “How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 8 (1), 130–42.
Qian, Y. (2003) “How Reform Worked in China,” in D. Rodrik (ed.), Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tenev, S., C. Zhang and L. Brefort (2002) Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institutions of Modern Markets. Washington, DC: World Bank and IFC.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2006 Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Watanabe, M. (2006). The State as an “Expropriating” Concentrated Owner in China. In: Watanabe, M. (eds) Recovering Financial Systems. IDE-JETRO. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230624863_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230624863_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-28141-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-62486-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)