Abstract
Laurence BonJour’s epistemology is marked by careful reflection on the consequences of epistemic internalism for an overall theory of epistemic justification. Epistemic internalism requires that the facts which determine whether a subject’s belief is justified are internal or mental facts, facts that, in some sense, a subject is aware of. BonJour formerly argued that epistemic internalism implied epistemic coherentism. A crucial part of this overall argument was a defense of the Sellarsian dilemma. This dilemma attacks foundationalist internalist views that attempt to ground basic beliefs in experiential states such as appearances, seemings, immediate apprehensions, direct awarenesses, or intuitions. BonJour argued that the requirement that these states do not require further reasons conflicts with the internalist requirement that these states provide reasons for a subject to believe that some proposition is true.1
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© 2014 Ted L. Poston
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Poston, T. (2014). BonJour and the Myth of the Given. In: Reason and Explanation. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012265_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012265_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-43655-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-01226-5
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