Abstract
Kant famously claims that emotions, as such, cannot be morally required: ‘Love as an inclination cannot be commanded’ (G 4:399). At times, his attitude seems even more negative:
[I]nclinations … are so far from having an absolute worth … that it must instead be the wish of every rational being to be altogether free of them. (G 4:428)
[They] … are always burdensome to a rational being, and though he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them. (KpV 5:118)
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© 2014 Patrick R. Frierson
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Frierson, P.R. (2014). Affective Normativity. In: Cohen, A. (eds) Kant on Emotion and Value. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137276650_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137276650_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-44676-6
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