Abstract
The debate between internalists and externalists is multifaceted, straddling vexed issues in contemporary philosophy. This chapter focuses on the distinction between content and vehicle as it pertains to the internalism/externalism debate in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Whereas content internalism/externalism seeks to give an account of what makes mental states have the contents they have rather than some other contents or no contents at all, vehicle internalism/externalism seeks to give an account of the processes or mechanisms that enable mental states with contents to play a causal role in, for example, guiding behaviour.1 In general, we understand externalism as the negation of internalism.
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© 2014 Mark Sprevak and Jesper Kallestrup
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Sprevak, M., Kallestrup, J. (2014). Entangled Externalisms. In: Sprevak, M., Kallestrup, J. (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137286734_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137286734_5
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