Delegation and Agency in International Relations

Abstract

This chapter presents the theoretical argument for delegation and agency in the CSDP. It explains why the member states delegate functions in this sensitive area and under which conditions EU officials exert agency. In addressing these research questions, it uses rational choice institutionalism and the principal-agent model. The chapter starts with delegation. It argues that delegation is best seen as a process in which member states at subsequent moments make cost-benefit calculations on whether to provide the EU bureaucracies with new functions or not. Delegation can be beneficial, as it potentially lowers the transaction costs of cooperation. However, it also involves a number of sovereignty costs, which limit delegation. The second section discusses the agency of EU officials. It starts with the goal conflicts between member states and EU officials. It then provides an overview of the resources of EU officials and the control mechanisms of the member states. It concludes by identifying opportunities for agency in the different phases of the policy process.