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Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance ((PSHF))

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Abstract

The Conservative MP Edward Heath was elected Leader of the Opposition in July 1965 and subsequently led the party to victory in the 1970 general election. This period witnessed a tidal wave of currency speculation, which swept across Britain from 1965 to 1967. While Britain was finally forced into the 1967 devaluation, the exigencies of the sterling crisis in the mid-1960s urged furtherance of an international credit facility — the 1968 Basle Agreement. This had the intended effect of stabilising sterling, but seriously undermined its standing as a reserve currency, prompting leading Conservatives and UK officials to address European monetary cooperation when the Conservative Party returned to power. The agreement, it seems, was a major tipping point which drove the Conservatives from the rhetoric of sovereignty over sterling towards realistic policy options.

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Notes

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© 2015 Kiyoshi Hirowatari

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Hirowatari, K. (2015). The Conservatives and European Monetary Cooperation. In: Britain and European Monetary Cooperation, 1964–1979. Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137491428_2

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