Abstract
In the quarter-century Chinese Civil War, Mao Tse-tung’s ill-equipped, poorly trained million-man peasant army defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s modern, well-equipped, three-million-man armored force. Although Mao and Chiang both sought to rebuild a self-respecting, independent China within their shared strategic culture, their contrasting strategies epitomize the poles of Shih-theory—Shih and Li.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See James P. Harrison, Modern Chinese Nationalism (New York: Hunter College of the University of New York, 1969), 22.
See Owen Lattimore, China Memoirs: Chiang Kai Shek and the War Against Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990), 135–136.
Sven Hedin, Chiang Kai Shek: Marshal of China (New York: John Day, 1940), 80–91.
Stuart Schram, Mao Tse Tung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 47.
Oliver J. Caldwell, A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944–1945 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), 25.
Lloyd Eastman, Seed of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution 1937–1949 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 144.
See Ralph Sawyer, ed. and trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (San Francisco: Westview, 1993), 213–214.
See Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 97.
Chang Chun-ming, Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times (New York: St. John’s University, 1981), 296.
See Soon Kyu Kim, History of Chinese Strategy and Tactics (Seoul: Research Center for Defense History, 1996), 66.
Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 64.
Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 206.
See Wu Tien-wei, The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), 104–105.
See Donald G. Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1949 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).
See Jin-young Lee, Joongkuk In Minhae Bang Kunsa: History of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Seoul: Research Center for Defense History, 1998), 138–139; Jin-young Seo, Joong Kuk Hyuk Myung Sa, 202.
See William Hinton, Fan Shen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (New York: Random House, 1966), 200.
See F.F. Liu, “Defeat by Military Default,” in The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Collapse or Conquest?, ed. P.Y. Loh (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1965), 10–11.
Thomas Cleary, trans., The Art of War, in Classics of Strategy and Counsel: The Collected Translations of Thomas Cleary, by Thomas Cleary, vol. 1 (Boston: Shambhala, 2000), 110.
Roger T. Ames, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine, 1993), 76–77.
See Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-Chi Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 26–27.
Byung-Chon Ro, Dohae Sonja Byungbub (Sun Tzu’s Art of War) (Seoul: Hanwon Press, 1990) 155.
Copyright information
© 2006 William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mott, W.H., Kim, J.C. (2006). The Chinese Civil War. In: The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983138_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983138_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-53326-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-4039-8313-8
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)