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Blackmail

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Abstract

The criminality of blackmail has been debated vigorously by legal theorists and economists for a considerable amount of time. Yet to date there appears to be no universally agreed upon theoretical rationale for making blackmail illegal. This entry reviews the theory of blackmail developed in the law and economics literature over the last 40 years and some of the critiques that were leveled against it. It argues that the social efficiency considerations emphasized in the economic model of blackmail offer a coherent unifying framework for thinking about this issue.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia

    Oleg Yerokhin

Authors
  1. Oleg Yerokhin
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Correspondence to Oleg Yerokhin .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrst. Finanzwissenschaft/ Finanzsoziologie, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Thüringen, Germany

    Jürgen Backhaus

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© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Yerokhin, O. (2015). Blackmail. In: Backhaus, J. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_523-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_523-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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