Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work
2002; Czumaj, Vöcking
Problem Definition
This entry considers a selfish routing model formally introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [10], in which the goal is to route the traffic on parallel links with linear latency functions. One can describe this model as a scheduling problem with m independent machines with speeds s1, …, s m and n independent tasks with weights w1, …, w n . The goal is to allocate the tasks to the machines to minimize the maximum load of the links in the system.
It is assumed that all tasks are assigned by noncooperative agents. The set of pure strategies for task i is the set {1, …, m}, and a mixed strategy is a distribution on this set.
Given a combination (j1, …, j n ) ∈ { 1, …, m}n of pure strategies, one for each task, the cost for task i is \(\sum \nolimits_{j_{k}=j_{i}}\frac{w_{k}} {s_{j_{i}}}\), which is the time needed for machine j i chosen by task ito complete all tasks allocated to that machine....
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Recommended Reading
Awerbuch B, Azar Y, Richter Y, Tsur D (2006) Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria. Theor Comput Sci 361(2–3):200–209
Christodoulou G, Koutsoupias E, Nanavati A (2009) Coordination mechanisms. Theor Comput Sci 410(36):3327–3336
Czumaj A (2004) Selfish routing on the Internet. In: Leung J (ed) Handbook of scheduling: algorithms, models, and performance analysis. CRC, Boca Raton
Czumaj A, Vöcking B (2007) Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria. ACM Trans Algorithms 3(1):Article 4
Czumaj A, Krysta P, Vöcking B (2010) Selfish traffic allocation for server farms. SIAM J Comput 39(5):1957–1987
Fischer S, Vöcking B (2007) On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibria. Theor Comput Sci 378(2):165–174
Fotakis D, Kontogiannis S, Koutsoupias E, Mavronicolas M, Spirakis P (2009) The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game. Theor Comput Sci 410(36):3305–3326
Gairing M, Lücking T, Mavronicolas M, Monien B (2006) The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost. Theor Comput Sci 369(1–3):116–135
Gonnet G (1981) Expected length of the longest probe sequence in hash code searching. J Assoc Comput Mach 28(2):289–304
Koutsoupias E, Papadimitriou CH (1999) Worst-case equilibria. In: Proceeding of the 16th annual symposium on theoretical aspects of computer science (STACS), Trier, pp 404–413
Koutsoupias E, Mavronicolas M, Spirakis P (2003) Approximate equilibria and ball fusion. Theory Comput Syst 36(6):683–693
Mavronicolas M, Spirakis P (2001) The price of selfish routing. In: Proceeding of the 33rd annual ACM symposium on theory of computing (STOC), Heraklion, pp 510–519
Nash JF Jr (1951) Non-cooperative games. Ann Math 54(2):286–295
Vöcking B (2007) Selfish load balancing. In: Nisan N, Roughgarden T, Tardos É, Vazirani V (eds) Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this entry
Cite this entry
Czumaj, A., Vöcking, B. (2016). Price of Anarchy for Machines Models. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_300
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_300
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4939-2863-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-4939-2864-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceReference Module Computer Science and Engineering