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Sharing Profit and Risk in a Partnership

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Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation

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Abstract

The setting up of a new partnership involves negotiation. Would-be partners must agree on a scheme for dividing uncertain future profits (or losses). We consider partnerships of two or more partners where initial investment is equal and the negotiated division depends only on the partners’ attitudes toward risk, their beliefs concerning future profit, and their alternatives (i.e., the disagreement point). We propose several schemes. First, an asymmetric approach starts with one party making a decision that maximizes its expected utility that respects the other’s individual rationality. The other two schemes are symmetric and based on negotiation; they rely on the Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, respectively, and their unbalanced versions. We provide general definitions and highlight some special cases.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Industrial Engineering, Tel Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel

    Yigal Gerchak & Eugene Khmelnitsky

Authors
  1. Yigal Gerchak
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  2. Eugene Khmelnitsky
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Correspondence to Yigal Gerchak .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wilfrid Laurier University Dept. Mathematics, Waterloo, ON, Canada

    D. Marc Kilgour

  2. University of Strathclyde Strathclyde Business School, Glasgow, UK

    Colin Eden

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Gerchak, Y., Khmelnitsky, E. (2020). Sharing Profit and Risk in a Partnership. In: Kilgour, D., Eden, C. (eds) Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12051-1_46-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12051-1_46-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-12051-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-12051-1

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