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Retributive Justice

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Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
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Introduction

“Retribution” has its roots in the Latin word retribuere, a verb that is composed of the prefix re-, “to return,” and tribuere, “to divide among tribes.” Taken together, retribuere means roughly “to pay in return” (Fassin 2018, p. 48). In modern times, “retribution” and especially “retributive justice” are, at least within academic circles, associated almost exclusively with retributivism and retributive theories of punishment (see, e.g., Walen 2020).

There have been many different kinds of theories for the justification of punishment that either self-identify or are at least regarded by others as offering a “retributive” theory of punishment (see, e.g., Cottingham 1979 and Walker 1999). The consensus in recent years is that a “retributive theory” is one that justifies punishment in terms of the desert of the wrongdoer (Berman 2011, p. 437). Many trace the intellectual roots of such a retributive theory back to Kant (e.g., Murphy 1973; Honderich 1984), though it is...

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Correspondence to Ambrose Y. K. Lee .

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Lee, A.Y.K. (2022). Retributive Justice. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_909-1

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