Abstract
Using an analysis of a voluntary action caused by a visual perception, I suggest that the three fundamental characteristics of this perception (being conscious, self-conscious, and provided with a content) are neurologically implemented by three distinct higher order properties of brain dynamics. This hypothesis allows me to sketch out a physicalist naturalist solution to the mind-body problem. According to this solution, primary phenomenal consciousness is neither a non-physical substance, nor a non-physical property but simply the “format” that the brain gives to a part of its dynamics in order to obtain a fine tuning with its environment when the body acts on it.
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Nannini, S. The mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience: a physicalist naturalist solution. Neurol Sci 39, 1509–1517 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10072-018-3455-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10072-018-3455-6