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Geographic Concentration of Institutional Blockholders and Workplace Safety Violations

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Abstract

This study uses insights from the political perspective on corporate governance to investigate the influence of geographic concentration of institutional blockholders on workplace safety violations. When institutional investors who have a blockholding stake (i.e., institutional blockholders) are geographically concentrated, corporate managers are more likely to pursue efficiency at the expense of employee interests because these blockholders may find it easier to coordinate their actions, strengthening their power over corporate managers and ultimately giving rise to more workplace safety violations. We also contend that the influence of institutional blockholders’ geographic concentration on workplace safety violations hinges upon the ownership of employees, socially responsible investment funds, and the CEO. Findings from a longitudinal sample of 1316 U.S. firms support our arguments. This study contributes to a nascent stream of research examining the influence of capital market participants on workplace safety by highlighting the role of institutional blockholders’ geographic concentration as a new channel through which investors can shape employee outcomes.

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Notes

  1. Since 47.8% of employee right violations are related to employee workplace safety violations, we only keep these violations for our tests. Our results are robust if we also include other types of employee right violations.

  2. We measure our three moderators using dummy variables because we test our moderating hypotheses through subgroup analyses given that we use firm fixed effects regressions. We would like to acknowledge that such an approach may neglect differences in the levels of employee ownership, SRI ownership, and CEO ownership.

  3. In unreported results, we control for all the three moderators and then test the main effect of blockholder geographic concentration on workplace safety violations. We continue to find significant results.

  4. We also use firm fixed effects Poisson regressions to model the number of workplace safety violations and our results are consistent with results from firm fixed effects OLS regressions.

  5. The data used to measure the BTI are obtained from the American Travel Survey, which was carried out by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics of the U.S. Department of Transportation in 1995.

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Acknowledgements

All the authors contributed equally to this study and names are listed in an alphabetical order. We would like to thank Dr. Ming Jia and two anonymous reviewers for their support and constructive feedback. Orhun Guldiken would like to devote this study to his late father, Tufan Guldiken.

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  1. Department of Accounting, Renmin University of China, No.59 Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing, 100872, China

    Xin Cheng

  2. Department of International Business, MANGO 429, College of Business, Florida International University, Miami, FL, 33199, USA

    Orhun Guldiken

  3. Department of Management, Miami Herbert Business School, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33146, USA

    Wei Shi

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Cheng, X., Guldiken, O. & Shi, W. Geographic Concentration of Institutional Blockholders and Workplace Safety Violations. J Bus Ethics 186, 593–613 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-022-05249-0

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