Abstract
The aim of the article is to give an outline of a value theory suitable for climate ethics, based on a perfectionist account on the convergence between prudential values and moral responsibility. I claim that such a convergence may generate a system of values that specify norms and obligations and attribute responsibility towards future generations, and thereby provides us with a measure of acceptable political action.
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Notes
According to climate research the consequences of global warming will be so serious that existing social and political institutions would face great difficulties handling the crisis (see IPCC 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Download here: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/). The world has known about global warming since 1990, when the first IPCC report was published, yet climate gas emissions have increased over 30% the last 20–25 years. The political sins of omission are rooted in decades long tug-of-war concerning responsibilities (historical responsibilities) and discussions about how to set a global cap on CO2—emissions and how to distribute burdens.
According to the UN IPCC, socio-economics are most important in hindering future effects of climate change. C.f. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, chapter 20.3.2 “Factors that support sustainable development”. Download here: https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/contents.html.
C.f. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (WGII AR5 Summary for Policymakers). Download here: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf.
C.f. the UN Climate Change Panel 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, pp. 11–20. Download here: http://www.hko.gov.hk/climate_change/ed_package/doc/impacts_av.pdf.
There are of course theories which address basic needs, such as John Rawls’ theory of justice (1971), the capability approach of Nussbaum and Sen (1993) and Sen (1984, 1985, 1987), and the needs based theories of Braybrooke (1987) and Hamilton (2003). But they are all critical responses to John Rawls, resulting that political philosophy has centered on abstract problems concerning rights on the one hand and preference utilitarianism on the other, even if there are alternative movements within post-Rawlsian criticism, critical theory and various types of theories about democracy. My point is that political theory has focused on issues of justice and concepts of well-being from a defense or a critique of preference utilitarianism at the expense of basic needs.
Climate gas emissions affect the physical and the biological environment in way that will intervene in everyday lives of future individual. Natural emissions will also affect the CO2-level in the atmosphere, but they also have what the climatologist refer to as “a drain”. Human emissions, on the other hand, are an additional one-directional flow which ruins the balance. The extra amount of climate gases is only very slowly removed from the atmosphere, probably over thousands of years, and they accumulate. This is confirmed by measurements that show that present day levels are 30% over the pre-industrial levels. All serious climate research attributes responsibility for this increase to human activity. C.f. UN Climate Change Panel 2014: Synthesis Report. Download here: https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf.
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Berdinesen, H. Values in Climate Ethics. J Agric Environ Ethics 31, 389–403 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9734-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9734-7