Abstract
In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Dennis Stampe, Martha Gibson, Alan Sidelle, Berent Enç, Al Mele, as well as a special thanks to the participants and organizers of the Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference 2005, especially Hud Hudson and Ned Markosian.
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Chant, S.R., Ernst, Z. Group intentions as equilibria. Philos Stud 133, 95–109 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9008-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9008-5