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t-Private and t-Secure Auctions

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Abstract

In most of the auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one might be interested in hiding these values. Some cryptographically secure protocols for electronic auctions have been presented in the last decade. Our work extends these protocols in several ways. On the basis of garbled circuits, i.e., encrypted circuits, we present protocols for sealed-bid auctions that fulfill the following requirements: 1) protocols are information-theoretically t-private for honest but curious parties; 2) the number of bits that can be learned by malicious adversaries is bounded by the output length of the auction; 3) the computational requirements for participating parties are very low: only random bit choices and bitwise computation of the XOR-function are necessary. Note that one can distinguish between the protocol that generates a garbled circuit for an auction and the protocol to evaluate the auction. In this paper we address both problems. We will present a t-private protocol for the construction of a garbled circuit that reaches the lower bound of 2t + 1 parties, and a more randomness efficient protocol for (t + 1)2 parties. Finally, we address the problem of bid changes in an auction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Theoretische Informatik, Universität zu Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany

    Markus Hinkelmann & Andreas Jakoby

  2. Fachgruppe Didaktik der Informatik und E-Learning, Universität Siegen, Siegen, Germany

    Peer Stechert

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  1. Markus Hinkelmann
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  2. Andreas Jakoby
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  3. Peer Stechert
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Correspondence to Markus Hinkelmann.

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Hinkelmann, M., Jakoby, A. & Stechert, P. t-Private and t-Secure Auctions. J. Comput. Sci. Technol. 23, 694–710 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-008-9174-3

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