Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Let’s Get Emotional: the Strategic Use of Emotions in China’s Foreign Policy

  • Published:
East Asia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this article, I assess how states can use emotions as a strategic tool to advance their preferences in international politics. To test the argument in the literature on the significant role that emotions can play in international politics, I examine why China reacted the way it did to the 2008 torch relay fallout in France as a case study. Instead of material power playing a central role in this case, it was what the event (i.e., the torch relay, pro-Tibet protests, and the attempt to seize the torch out of the hands of a Chinese) represented in the minds of Chinese. This case study highlights the significant role that identity and emotions play in international politics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In the international relations literature, material factors are regarded as either economic factors, such as trade or military capabilities. Emotions and identity are not considered in the literature as material factors because there is no tangible value such as money or weapons. Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists devote ample attention to non-material issues such as identity.

  2. It is important to note that a state’s use of nationalist emotion is not limited to a non-democracy like China; instead, both democratic and non-democrats state actors can use such nationalist emotion in aiming to acquire leverage in international bargaining.

  3. For more on the importance of the Chinese government not appearing weak to its domestic audience regarding international affairs, see [1, 2].

  4. Spring rage is a term that I use to refer to the time period in China that PRC netizens played a central role in during the aftermath of the Tibetan riots. It reached its apex during the torch relay fallout, and ended with the French government and Carrefour going to great lengths to demonstrate their sorrow for the torch relay incident in Paris.

  5. The torch relay was called the “Journey of Harmony.”

  6. For an assessment that it was not simply human rights that denied Beijing the 2000 Games, see [6]. Polumbaum argues there were a number of issues the IOC took into account, such as financing and the environment to name two [6].

  7. Reflecting this enthusiasm about the Olympics, a massive number of Chinese wanted to serve as volunteers. Exactly one year prior to the Olympics, there were already five times more Chinese people willing to volunteer at the Olympics than needed. The estimated number of volunteers needed was 100,000, and China had 560,000 willing to do so in August 2007 [9]. In conducting polls both in Beijing and throughout China, independent organizations found that 90% of respondents or higher consistently supported Beijing’s desire for the Games [3]. In brief, it was not just about Beijing hosting the Games; rather, the country was hosting the Games [3].

  8. The slogan of the Beijing Olympic Games was one of inclusion: “One World, One Dream.”

  9. Many Chinese viewed the Olympics as giving their nation face [6, 7]. The concept of face runs deep in Chinese culture as well as other Confucian-influenced countries [see 10], p. 135]. A loss of face in China has profound implications. As such, Chinese culture stresses the importance of obtaining face and preventing the loss of face [10], pp. 135, 209]. With the Century of Humiliation, it has been presented in China as the ultimate loss of face that China has experienced and China needs to redeem itself for such a loss of face. On the topic of face, the massive $40-billion-dollar infrastructure investments in Beijing, including the world’s biggest airport terminal, were a sign to both its people and to the world that Beijing is a very modern city with all the things that an advanced city in the world has. In this quest to obtain face, the Chinese government commissioned top architects throughout the world to design Olympic venues, with the goal being to make Beijing a very modern city [11]. In preparation for the Olympics, Beijing carried out a massive campaign to educate its public in Beijing about how to act during the Olympics. Bus drivers, for example, were trained on how to act. Crossing guards were given instructions to prevent people from jaywalking. Ordinary citizens were told how to get on and off the subway—not to shove people aside and wait until others get off before getting on. Locals were notified not to spit on the ground. The government was concerned about a loss of face among its international guests with all of these issues [12].

  10. The Chinese government has stated that various areas and issues are consider as core interests of the Chinese government—e.g., Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang [13]. The Chinese government first used the term to describe Taiwan as a core interest and has expanded the number since. The Chinese government uses the term to signal to other states that these are issues of paramount importance for the Chinese government, and thus other states should not press China on stated core interests.

  11. Related to this argument, Edney argues that the Chinese government has its domestic audience in mind regarding its interest in advancing soft power [14]. According to Edney, the CCP aims to advance soft power in China to achieve a domestic political objective with its domestic audience.

  12. Translated as the Garden of Perfect Brightness, and known as the Old Summer Palace, it was the main living quarters in Beijing for five Qing emperors from the early eighteenth century to the mid nineteenth century.

  13. Eznack [29] also argues that strategic calculations do have an impact on leaders’ decision to get emotional in IR.

  14. As pointed out earlier, in fact, the entire city of Lhasa was not destroyed. Instead, it was only certain shops of certain areas. However, this was not the way that the Chinese media nor the way that the Chinese government presented it.

  15. For a detailed account of the riot, see [36].

  16. Also regarding CNN, thousands protested outside of CNN’s studio in LA, specifically targeting Jack Cafferty, for he referred to the Chinese government as “goons and thugs.” After that comment received much criticism from both Chinese masses and state actors, Cafferty stated that he was talking about the government—not the people. That did not satisfy mainland or overseas Chinese, as they did not want any foreigners being critical of their own. The following comments by Jiang Yu during the Chinese foreign ministry’s press conference on April 15, 2008 reflect how the Chinese government embraced an emotional view of CNN: “We are shocked to hear the malicious attacks of CNN commentator Jack Cafferty against the Chinese people.” She went on to add that he demonstrated “hatred to the Chinese people” and stated that he should “apologize to all the Chinese people.” [45] During the Chinese foreign ministry’s press conference on April 24, 2008, Jiang Yu stated that Cafferty’s comments, “deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” [46]

  17. Human flesh search engines in China are devoted to drawing attention to specific people, often people viewed as anti-China, with the goal of destroying them.

  18. What was not recognized by many in China, including the media, was that 99% of Carrefour’s employees (over 40,000) in China that year were local workers for its 122 stores [41]. During spring rage, a French MNC that provided 40,000 jobs for locals was a non-issue. The real issue was national pride on the part of Chinese.

  19. The Chinese government is very concerned about preventing collective action and removes any material online that may possibly result in people taking to the streets due to government grievances [see 61].

  20. Gries also argues that realism’s emphasis on material power does not help when examining events such as the 2008 torch relay and ties between China and the West during that time period of 2008 [20].

References

  1. Raine, Sarah. (2011) Beijing’s South China Sea Debate. Survival 53(5), 69–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Cairns, Christopher and Allen Carlson. 2016. Real-world Islands in a Social Media Sea: Nationalism and Censorship on Weibo during the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Crisis.China Quarterly 225, 23–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Mol, Arthur P.J. (2010) Sustainability as global attractor: the greening of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Global Networks 10, pp. 510–528.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Shirk, Susan L. (2008) China: Fragile Superpower Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Brittingham, Michael Alan (2007) The “Role” of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy: A Reactive Model of Nationalism and Conflict. Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, pp. 147–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Polumbaum, Judy (2003) Capturing the flame: aspirations and representations of Beijing’s 2008 Olympics, in Chin-Chuan Lee (ed.). Chinese Media, Global Contexts, pp. 57–75 (London: Routledge Curzon).

  7. Gries, Peter Hayes, H. Michael Crowson and Todd Sandel (2010) The Olympic Effect on American Attitudes towards China: beyond personality, ideology, and media exposure. Journal of Contemporary China 19, pp. 213–231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Press Conference on the Overall Operations of the Beijing Olympic Games Opening Ceremony, trans. Ted Wang (2009). Chinese Law and Government 42, pp. 52–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. The Economist, The Beijing Olympics: On Your Marks (and Lenin), August 9, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9621556/print

  10. Jacques, Martin. 2009. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order.

  11. Broudehoux, Anne-Marie (2007) Spectacular Beijing: The Conspicuous Construction of an Olympic Metropolis. Journal of Urban Affairs 29, pp. 383–399.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Nathan, Andrew J. (2008) Medals and Rights. The New Republic, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/books/medals-and-rights-o, accessed 11 August 2010.

  13. Beijing Review. (2013). China’s declaration of key interests misinterpreted. http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-08/26/content_29824049.htm. Accessed 10 April 2015.

  14. Edney, Kingsley. 2012. Soft Power and the Chinese Propaganda System.. Journal of Contemporary China 21(78), 899–914.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Kurlantzick, Joshua, (2008) Swifter, Higher, Crueler,. The New Republic. http://www.tnr.com/print/article/swifter-higher-crueler

  16. Foster, Angus. (2008) Making Sense of Modern China, BBC News. http://bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/7427992/stm

  17. Callahan, William A. (2010) China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford University Press: New York.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Law, Wing-Wah. The State, Citizenship Education, and International Events in a Global Age: The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games,. Comparative Education Review Vol. 54, No. 3 (2010), pp. 343–367

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Callahan, William A. (2004) National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism.. Alternatives 29, 199–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Gries, Peter Hays. (2009) Problems of Misperception in U.S.-China Relations.. Orbis spring, 220–232.

  21. Zhao, Suisheng. 2013. Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn.. Journal of Contemporary China 22 (82): 535–553.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Steinberg, Belma S. (1991) Shame and Humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Psychological Perspective. Political Psychology 12(4), 653–690.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Ross, Andrew A.G. (2013) Realism, emotion, and dynamic allegiances in global politics. International Theory 5(2), 273–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Lowenheim, Oded and Gadi Heimann. (2008) Revenge in International Politics.. Security Studies 17(4), 685–724.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Hall, Todd H. (2011) We will not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger.. Security Studies 20(4), 521–555.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Hall, Todd H. (2012) Sympathetic States: Explaining the Russian and Chinese Responses September 11.. Political Science Quarterly 127(3), 369–400.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Wolf, Reinhard. (2011) Respect and disrespect in international politics: the significance of status recognition.. International Theory 3(1), 105–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Saurette, Paul. (2006) You dissin me? Humiliation and post 9/11 global politics. Review of International Studies 32, 495–522.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Eznack, Lucile. (2013) The Mood Was Grave: Affective Dispositions and States’ Anger-Related Behaviour.. Contemporary Security Policy 34(3), 552–580.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. Larson, Deborah Welch and Alexei Shevchenko. (2010) Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy.. International Security 34(4), 63–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. Zhou, Min and Hanning Wang. 2016. Participation in Anti-Japanese Demonstrations in China: Evidence from a Survey on Three Elite Universities in Beijing.. Journal of East Asian Studies 16, 391–413.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. Fu, Ying. The West Pays a Price for Loving to Hate China, April 15, 2008, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-04/15/content_6616521.htm

  33. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Remarks on Paris City Council’s Decisions Concerning Dalai, April 23, 2008. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/fyrth/t428250.htm

  34. Yang, Dali L. (2008) Forced Harmony: China’s Olympic Rollercoaster. Current History September, pp. 243–249.

  35. Stratfor. (2008) France: Sarkozy Gives China a ‘Show of Face’.

  36. Topgyal, Tsering (2011) Insecurity Dilemma and the Tibetan Uprising in 2008. Journal of Contemporary China 20, pp. 183–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  37. The Economist, China and Tibet: Welcome to the Olympics). March 27, 2008. https://www.economist.com/asia/2008/03/27/welcome-to-the-olympics

  38. Permanent Mission of China to the UN. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on April 8, 2008. http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t423126.htm

  39. Elegant, Simon. Why China’s Burning Mad, April 24, 2008, Time, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1734821,00.html

  40. Bennhold, Katrin and Elisabeth Rosenthal. (April 7, 2008) Olympic torch relay through Paris turns into melee.. New York Times

  41. NBC News. (2008) Anti-French protests spread in China.

  42. Qin, Jize. (2008) Volunteers Guard the Sacred Flame, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/torch/2008-04/18/content_6625574.htm

  43. Ramzy, Austin, (2008) China’s View of the Olympic Torch War, Time. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1729169,00.html

  44. Rong, Jiaojiao. Smiling Angel in Wheelchair the Talk of a Nation. http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/nv/t432120.htm

  45. Permanent Mission of China to the UN. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on April 15, 2008. http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t425858.htm

  46. Permanent Mission of China to the UN. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on April 24, 2008. http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t425858.htm

  47. The Economist, Cyber-Nationalism: The Brave New World of e-Hatred, July 24, 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11792535

  48. China Daily, Protests Erupt in Chinese Cities, April 19 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/19/content_6629332.htm;

  49. BBC News. (2008) Anti-French Rallies Across China. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/7356107.stm

  50. Fish, Eric. (2016) A History of China’s Humiliation and ‘Hurt Feelings’ at the Olympics.. Asia Society

  51. BBC News. (2008) China Discouraging France Trips, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/7428403.stm

  52. China Daily, France Urged to Reflect Upon Chinese Public’s Opinions, April 15, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/15/content_6619243.htm;

  53. China Daily Chinese Expatriates in France Rally in Support of Games, April 20, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/20/content_6629650.htm

  54. China Daily, Chinese Holding Rallies to Back Beijing Games, April 20, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/20/content_6630183.htm ;

  55. China.org.cn. Carrefour’s statement welcomed against Tibet independence 2008. http://www.china.org.cn/2008-04/23/content_14998002.htm

  56. China Daily. Carrefour staff put on new uniform to show patriotism. April 30, 2008. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/citylife/2008-04/30/content_6654439.htm

  57. Zhang, H. (2008) Torchbearer invited to visit France again, China Daily, 22 April, accessed at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/olypmics/2008-04/22/content_6673994.htm, 11 August 2010.

  58. NBC News. (2008) China tries to calm anti-France protests.

  59. Gov.cn, 2008) China calls for joint efforts with France to promote bilateral ties. http://www.gov.cn/misc/2008-04/22/content_951555.htm

  60. Jacobs, Andrew. Anti-French Boycott Falters in China, May 2, 2008, The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/world/asia/02china.html

  61. King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.. American Political Science Review 107 (2): 326–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  62. The Economist, The Beijing Olympics: Let the Games Begin, August 15, 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11912951/print

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ, USA

    Christopher B. Primiano

Authors
  1. Christopher B. Primiano
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christopher B. Primiano.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Primiano, C.B. Let’s Get Emotional: the Strategic Use of Emotions in China’s Foreign Policy. East Asia 35, 197–214 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9296-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9296-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation