Abstract
A bargaining problem with two players, Labor (player L) and Management (player M) is considered. The players must decide the monthly wage paid to L by M. At the beginning players L and M submit their offers x and y. If x ≤ y there is an agreement at (x + y)/2. If not, the arbiter is called in and he chooses the offer which is nearest to his solution α. The arbiter imposes a solution α which is concentrated in two points with probabilities p = 1/2. The equilibrium in the arbitration game among pure and mixed strategies is derived.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Nash J., The bargaining problem, Econometrica, 18 (1950), 155–162.
Luce R. D., Raiffa H., Games and Decisions, Wiley (1957).
Leitman G., Collective bargaining: a differential game, J. Opt. Th. Appl. 11 (1973), 405–412.
Chatterjee K., Comparison of arbitration procedures: Models with complete and incomplete information, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, smc-11, no. 2 (1981), 101–109.
Kilgour D. M., Game-theoretic properties of final-offer arbitration, Group Decision and Negotiation, 3 (1994), 285–301.
Sakaguchi M., A time-sequential game related to an arbitration procedure, Math. Japonica 29, no. 3 (1984), 491–502.
Mazalov V. V., Zabelin A. A., Discrete final-offer arbitration model, RIMS Seria 1263 Development of the optimization theory for the dynamic systems and their applications (2002), Kyoto University Press, 117–130.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Birkhäuser Boston
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mazalov, V.V., Zabelin, A.A. (2005). Equilibrium in an Arbitration Procedure. In: Nowak, A.S., Szajowski, K. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 7. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4429-6_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4429-6_18
Publisher Name: Birkhäuser Boston
Print ISBN: 978-0-8176-4362-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-8176-4429-1
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)