Abstract
Hans Reichenbach’s distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification continues to be relevant all the way up to the present. This can be seen clearly in the tense relationship between the history and the philosophy of science. In the current debates about the relationships between these two disciplines one encounters arguments that Reichenbach used to defend this distinction, as well as arguments brought forth by his critics.1 Sometimes the discussions even refer directly to the influence of Reichenbach’s distinction (Giere 1999, pp. 11–18 and 217–230).
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SCHIEMANN, G. (2006). INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION AND DISCOVERY. ON HANS REICHENBACH’S FOUNDATION OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. In: SCHICKORE, J., STEINLE, F. (eds) Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Archimedes, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4251-5_3
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