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On Blending Attacks for Mixes with Memory

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Information Hiding (IH 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3727))

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Abstract

Blending attacks are a general class of traffic-based attacks, exemplified by the (n–1)-attack. Adding memory or pools to mixes mitigates against such attacks, however there are few known quantitative results concerning the effect of pools on blending attacks. In this paper we give a precise analysis of the number of rounds required to perform an (n–1)-attack on the pool mix, timed pool mix, timed dynamic pool mix and the binomial mix.

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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O’Connor, L. (2005). On Blending Attacks for Mixes with Memory. In: Barni, M., Herrera-Joancomartí, J., Katzenbeisser, S., Pérez-González, F. (eds) Information Hiding. IH 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3727. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11558859_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11558859_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29039-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31481-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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