Abstract
We show exact values for the price of anarchy of weighted and unweighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions. The given values also hold for weighted and unweighted network congestion games.
This work has been partially supported by the DFG-SFB 376 and by the European Union within the 6th Framework Programme under contract 001907 (DELIS).
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Aland, S., Dumrauf, D., Gairing, M., Monien, B., Schoppmann, F. (2006). Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games. In: Durand, B., Thomas, W. (eds) STACS 2006. STACS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3884. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11672142_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11672142_17
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