Abstract
We study multi-unit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints. We propose different price-quote policies and study their influence on the efficiency of market-based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote provided, indicating interesting tradeoffs in communication and allocation efficiency.
This work was supported by the NSF Engineering Research Center for Reconfigurable Manufacturing under Award EEC-9529125 of the National Science Foundation. An extended report is available from the authors.
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Schvartzman, L.J., Wellman, M.P. (2006). Market-Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids. In: La Poutré, H., Sadeh, N.M., Janson, S. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms. AMEC TADA 2005 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3937. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11888727_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11888727_5
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