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Grinds, E.L., Perrelli, R. (2005). Trade Games: Modelling WTO's Role in Trade Disputes. In: Heiduk, G.S., Wong, Ky. (eds) WTO and World Trade. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1630-2_20
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