Abstract
This chapter surveys the measurement of protection. Protection is defined here to cover governmental action (or inaction) that effectively discriminates in favor of home producers against foreign producers. Protection consists of transparent formal barriers such as tariffs and quotas, less transparent formal barriers such as licensing requirements and product standards, and informal barriers such as effectively discriminatory access to law enforcement, contract enforcement and market information. The broad definition of protection is adopted because there is good evidence that informal barriers are considerably higher than formal barriers, but not uniformly so across goods or countries. A disadvantage of the broad definition is that at the informal end of the spectrum, the barriers are less obviously connected to governmental action or inaction.
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© 2013 James E. Anderson
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Anderson, J.E. (2013). Measurement of Protection. In: Bernhofen, D., Falvey, R., Greenaway, D., Kreickemeier, U. (eds) Palgrave Handbook of International Trade. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-30531-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-30531-1_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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