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Unjustified Variation and Selective Retention in Scientific Discovery

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Studies in the Philosophy of Biology

Abstract

Are you awed by the exquisite fit between organism and environment, and find in this fit a puzzle needing explanation?

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© 1974 Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Campbell, D.T. (1974). Unjustified Variation and Selective Retention in Scientific Discovery. In: Ayala, F.J., Dobzhansky, T. (eds) Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01892-5_9

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