Abstract
How then will our theory rejoin our practice? Will it not be assimilable into any practice? Will it not sanction any wilful action? Does it not at least imply that there could be no rational basis for condemning any action? If by rational basis is meant some set of principles from which it could be deduced or cogently argued that such and such an action is wrong, independently of any desires of the person making the judgement or of some other person involved, then indeed there can be no rational basis for such condemnation. Condemnation can only be based upon a value.
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© 1978 F. C. T. Moore
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Moore, F.C.T. (1978). The Evaluation of Values. In: The Psychological Basis of Morality. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03735-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03735-3_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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