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Abstract

On 31 May 1949 as the Chinese Communists were sweeping to power over their US-supported rivals, Chou En-Lai secretly appealed to Washington for assistance so that China could ‘… serve in [the] international sphere as [a] mediator between [the] Western Powers and [the] USSR … and make [the] USSR discard policies leading to war.’1 Shortly afterwards Mao Tse-tung reportedly said that in the event of a US-USSR war, China was not committed to joining the Soviet Union.2 As a result of certain trends in US policy-making on China and the extreme sensitivity of the Chinese leadership due to delicate factional politics, Chou’s offer was never acted upon,3 and the great power configuration developed into its essentially bipolar form. The opportunity to have China emerge as an important third independent actor on the international scene was lost.

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Notes and References

  1. Reports of important discussions in the US about the possibility of Mao emerging as another Tito were viewed as leaks by CCP leaders. Clubb to Sec. State 18 August 1949 in ibid., pp. 496–8. For further discussion see Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (eds), The Uncertain Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

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  2. There have obviously been other major events in the past two decades but as it will be made clear in the introduction, we are only providing a study of certain aspects of the international system and do not pretend to do justice to all other subjects. For confirmation of the view on the importance of Sino-Soviet split see James Schlesinger’s remarks quoted in Michael Yahuda, ‘Problems of Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy’, Asian Affairs, vol.8, part 3 (Oct. 1977) p. 320.

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  3. Quoted in Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 18.

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  4. Joseph Frankel, Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 15–16.

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  5. The bipolar views are too numerous to list, but Joseph Nogee has done a superb job in collecting the titles in ‘Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept’ Orbis, vol.18, no.4 (Winter 1975) pp. 1193–1205. It is not the purpose of this study to provide a bibliographic essay, but some of the major works on tripolarity should be noted. Adelphi Papers no.66 (March 1970). Michael Tatu, ‘The Great Power Triangle Washington-Moscow-Peking’, Atlantic Papers, no.3, (Atlantic Institute, December 1970). Richard Lowenthal, ‘Russia and China: Controlled Conflict’, Foreign Affairs, vol.49, no.3 (April 1971). A collection of a few relevant articles on the triangle can be found in US Congress, Senate, International Negotiations: The Great Power Triangle. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 92nd Congress, 1st session (Washington: USGPO). Also, Ronald Yalem, ‘Tripolarity and the International System’, Orbis, vol.15, no.4 (Winter 1972).

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  6. William Griffith, ‘Peking, Moscow and Beyond the Sino-Soviet-American Triangle’, Washington Papers, no.6 (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1973).

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  7. William Griffith, ed. The World and the Great Power Triangles (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975).

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  8. In the 1960s, the only substantial analysis of the triangle was Donald Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967) when he deals explicitly with the great power triangle which overlay the Moscow, Peking, Hanoi triad. See also a perceptive paper delivered by Bernhardt Lieberman, ‘The Sino-Soviet Pair: Coalition Behaviour from 1921 to 1965’ at the Conference on Sino-Soviet relations and Arms Control, sponsored by the East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University. Airlie House, Warrenton Virginia, 30 Aug–1 Sept 1965. More recently the US Congress has held hearings on tripolarity, especially as regards the Sino-American axis.

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  9. US Congress, House, US-Soviet Union-China-The Great Power Triangle. Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, 94th Congress, Hearings 21 Oct 1975–June 1976 (Washington: USGPO, 1976).

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  10. Two excellent recent studies at the Rand Corporation are Thomas Gottlieb, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle. R-1902-NA (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, Nov. 1977),

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  11. and Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970’s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle’. R-2372-NA (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., July 1978).

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  12. Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Penguin, 1978).

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  13. Based on ibid., p.1212 and Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, ‘Multipolar Power System and International Stability’ in Rosenau ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, p.315. We stress that the notion of the system’s major characteristics not changing does not preclude temporary formation of alignments so long as the system does not take on permanently the form of a pair and an isolate. See David Wilkinson, Conflict and Cohesion (London: Frances Pinter, 1976) pp.117–18.

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  14. Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1977) p.119.

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  15. Within each of Morgan’s two types of deterrence there remains the three main components of deterrence, commitment, initiation and response, as studied by Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

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© 1982 Gerald Segal

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Segal, G. (1982). Introduction. In: The Great Power Triangle. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06059-7_1

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